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Abstract 
This thesis is a study on modelling the Turkish 
perception of foreign policy options regarding the water 
conflict between Syria and Turkey. A game theoretical model 
is used to analyze the current situation of the water 
conflict. Assurance Game is used as a model to analyze the 
conflict in question. It is argued that, Turkey perceives 
the current situation as an assurance game. In this study, 
the analysis showed that, a cooperative policy for the 
resolution of the conflict from the Turkish perspective is 
in fact the source of the conflict for the Syrian side. The 
paradox inherent in the perception of the conflict by both 
parties to the conflict makes it hard to reach a resolution. 
The study showed that, resolution of the current conflict, 
from the Turkish perspective, is the cooperation of both 
states regarding the linkage established between the water 
conflict and the alleged Syrian support provided for PKK 
terrorism in Turkey. 
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Özet 
Bu tez, Türkiye görüşüne göre, Türkiye ile Suriye 
arasındaki su sorununa ilişkin dış politika seçeneklerinin 
modellemesidir. Oyun teorik bir model güncel su sorununun 
incelenmesinde kullanılmıştır. Çalışmada sorunun Türkiye 
tarafından bir itimat oyunu olarak görüldüğü gösterilmiştir. 
Türkiye'nin görüşüne göre işbirliğine dayalı bir çözümün 
aslında Suriye tarafından sorunun kaynağı olduğu inceleme 
sonucunda gösterilmiştir. Çalışmada iki ülkenin sorunu 
görüşüne dayalı paradoksun çözüme ulaşılmasını zorlaştıran 
bir faktör olduğu belirlenmiştir. Türkiye'nin görüşüne 
göre, sorunun çözümü su sorunu ve Suriye' nin Türkiye' deki 
PKK terörizmine verdiği destek arasında kurulan bağlantı 
bazında işbirliği yapmaları ile mümkün olabilecektir. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of this study, first, is to 
describe the way Turkish foreign policy makers perceive 
different foreign policy options as regards the water 
conflict between Syria and Turkey. A game theoretical model 
is used as a forum to analyze the logic behind the Turkish 
interpretation of the current situation as regards the water 
conflict and related alleged Syrian support for PKK 
terrorism in Turkey. A second aim, by using the model, is 
to explain the constraints attached to the attainment of a 
cooperative solution to the conflict. 
The secondary goal of the study is to indicate the 
importance of a natural resource as a foreign policy item 
and to discuss the way states formulate their foreign 
policies by taking into account this new dimension. 
The study does not aim to elaborate on possible 
conflict resolution options and does not analyze the Syrian 
interpretation of the conflict situation. 
Before focusing on the scope and objective of the 
study, it is necessary to account for some preparatory 
dimensions which are essential for the conduct of the study 
itself and conclusions to be derived. 
1.1 The Need for an Analysis of the Turkish Perspective on 
the Water Conflict Between Syria and Turkey from a Game 
Theoretical Perspective 
The discipline of International Relations is founded 
on the notion that international politics is in essence 
state-centric and that the dominant mode of relations 
between states is power politics. Both of these axioms are 
nm·: under fierce challenge. With the end of the Cold War 
the world goes through various changes as regards the 
conduct of state affairs. The international relations 
paradigm is responsive to these changes as well. 
Security is one of the major international relations 
concepts which required a revision. The established 
definition of security, which involves only military threat, 
is altered and began to encompass a wider spectrum of issues 
that threatens the national security of every single actor 
in the world. 
Water is one of these new elements that began to 
dominate foreign policy agendas of states, and even began to 
turn out to be a natural resource threatening the 
international security. Water as an element of conflict in 
various parts of the world has its credit for a couple of 
decades. It has turned out to be an asset challenging the 
supremacy of oil as a source of dependence in the conduct of 
state relations. The most important problems have emerged, 
between Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan; Syria and Lebanon; 
Syria and Iraq; Egypt and Sudan; and Mexico and the US. 
The conflict examined in this study is the water 
conflict between Turkey and Syria over the utilization of 
the waters of the Euphrates River. The very beginning of 
the conflict coincides with the Turkey's first attempt to 
build a dam on the Euphrates in the early 1970s, and then 
with the formulation of a huge water project- called the 
2 
3AP: The Southeastern Anatolia Project- that was to be 
actualized on the Rivers of Euphrates and Tigris. Since the 
linkage between the water conflict and the alleged Syrian 
support for terrorism in Turkey is assumed to be there, 
chis study aims to model the Turkish perception of the water 
cor:f lict by using the framework provided by game theory. 
?he leading factor, in examining the Turkish perception of 
the water conflict between Syria and Turkey from a game 
theoretical angle, is the fact that the approach equips the 
analyst with a well-defined tool to understand foreign 
policy preferences of states. 
Game theory can simply be defined as a rational 
behaviour theory based on the assumption that one party 
assumes that the other party will present a rational 
behaviour. The most prominent feature of a game theoric 
approach lies in the fact that it allows one to simplify the 
factors involved in understanding the issue in 
consideration. The simplification provides the better 
understanding of the problem and the wielding of the 
preference orderings of both parties in the resolution of 
-che issue. Rational behaviour, as mentioned above, is the 
essential feature in game theoric approaches. 
1.2 Scope and Objective 
The study is conducted on the basis of the Turkish 
perception of the conflict by the Turkish state primarily on 
the difficulty of reaching a concord regarding perception. 
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Bhkei.i university 
Libraey 
Perceptual 
conduct of 
dispositions play a substantial 
international relations. The 
role in the 
perceiver's 
expectations and needs strongly influence the policy to be 
followed. Jervis argues that "even between close allies 
•.·.·here much background information is shared and deceptions 
is not much feared, the two sides can easily end up living 
in different worlds. 111 1 2 He also argues that, when dealing 
with an adversary, the state's ability to project the 
desired image- whether accurate or not- is even less. A 
necessary condition for doing so is an understanding of the 
other side's outlook and beliefs about the state. 3 
Therefore, the basic approach in this study stems from the 
importance, of understanding parties perceptual frames in 
conflicting situation. For this purpose, a game theoretical 
model is used to analyze the Turkish perception of the 
current situation as regards the water conflict and related 
alleged Syrian support for PKK terrorism in Turkey. An 
account of how they have different perceptions in this 
conflict is given throughout the study. 
Methodological importance of the study stems from the 
:ise of game theory in a way that is used by Snyder and 
~iesing~ in explaining the Turkish perception of the issue. 
Two main points are significant in modelling the current 
perception of the conflict in consideration by Turkey: 
• it explains the logic behind Turkey's current 
foreign policy preferences; 
4 
• it allows us to understand the constraints attached 
to the attainment of a cooperative solution to the conflict. 
This study shows that, the Turkish perception of the 
conflict, and the game theoretical exercise denotes that, 
the Turkish understanding of cooperation is in fact the 
source of the conflict for the Syrian side. 'I'his point 
indicates that there is a paradox in the entire standing of 
parties to the conflict: What constitutes the core of the 
conflict for Syria is the cooperative solution for the 
Turkish side which tries to attain to end the conflict. 
This means that Turkey tries to preserve the status quo, 
which in this case means the source of the conflict. The 
details of the way the above conclusion is reached can be 
=ound in the analysis and conclusion chapters. 
While the core of the study is the modelling of the 
":'urkish perception of the conflict, there are parts that 
have secondary implications in the entire study. These 
include, the examination of the 
understanding in the post-Cold War era; 
policy item; and implications on the 
conflict. 
1.3 Outline of the Study 
expanding 
water as 
resolution 
The study consists of seven chapters. 
The first chapter is the introduction part. 
security 
foreign 
of the 
The second chapter comprises review of literature on 
water conflict. 
5 
The third chapter 1.S on the change in the 
:..n::ernational system; new concepts of security and the 
:..mportance of water in this new international environment. 
In this chapter the question of how water has become an 
element in foreign policy making is discussed. 
The forth chapter describes Turkish Foreign Policy and 
Syr:..an Foreign Policy particularly towards the Middle East. 
This chapter is a descriptive one which provides a general 
framework of foreign policies of both states with a special 
emphasis on the Turkish Syrian bilateral relations. 
The fifth chapter particularly focuses on the water 
co:if lict between Turkey and Syria in which a descriptive 
account of .the conflict is given. 
Chapter six is the theoretical application part. In 
the first part of this chapter, the Turkish perception of 
::he current situation as regards the water conflict is 
given. In the following part, the game used in explaining 
t:he Turkish perception of the issue, Assurance Game, is 
presented, and then the reason for why Turkey perceives the 
current situation as an assurance game is studied. 
In the seventh chapter, the conclusions derived are 
exa=.ined. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW ON WATER CONFLICT 
This chapter presents an 
ca~ried out on the water conflict. 
on the studies conducted on 
account of the studies 
It particularly focuses 
the conflict over the 
utilization of the waters of the Euphrates River .1 The 
review is made in three categories: The first group 
co~sists of the studies that are more hydrological and 
geographical; the second category is composed of the 
general approach in international conferences held in 
Turkey; and the third group covers the studies that take 
into account the international relations dimension of the 
· .. ;a:.er issue. 
As for the hydrological and geographical studies, 
which are important works particularly for the researchers 
•1lo deal with the resolution of water conflicts, the 
foilowing account shall be given. 
The chief studies on the issue form a follow up set of 
studies prepared under the auspices of Associates for Middle 
East Research, (AMER), 2 a non-profit research group in 
Philadelphia, and has been directed by Professor Thomas Naff 
o.f -::he University of Pennsylvania. The project began in 
:953 with a broad-based pilot survey which was published the 
:o:.lm.;ing year under the title Water in the Middle East: 
~o~flict or Cooperation?3 This earliest research identified 
-::he ma]or issues and demonstrated the need for far more 
detailed analysis. 
The follow up study has been the work titled The 
E~phrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development 
Froject by John Kolars. In this project physical, political 
and socioeconomic factors are studied. The physical 
di=lensions of the water problem have been identified with 
reference to its hydrologic basin, and the political economy 
of the states are examined. The Future of the Euphrates 
Ri'ler is a study prepared in the same understanding by the 
same author. 
Another specialized person who is primarily concerned 
the sharing and price of water is Tony Allan of SOAS. 
Eis studies focus on the hydrological aspects; 
hydropoliti~s, and 
orientation make his 
the political 
studies to fit 
economy of 
to a global 
water 
line in 
sharing waters. 5 An edited book by the same scholar also 
presents a multi-disciplinary approach to the issue, giving 
~ore emphasis on the pricing of water and commercial 
aspects. 6 
A geographical study by Peter Beaumont, Gerald Blake, 
and Malcolm Wagstaff is also an essential source of 
i~for:nation written on the issue. 7 
The study of Peter Gleick on water resources is 
prepared in a multi-disciplinary fashion. 8 
Another work is conducted by Natasha Beschorner, 0 
whose study presents an overall analysis of the three Basins 
of the region from various dimensions. Similar works, that 
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are also essential in the water conflict literature are 
Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll's.10 
The study of John Waterbury of Princeton University 
also deserves attention as he studied the dynamics of 
cooperation in the utilization of the Euphrates. 11 Although 
the study is not much compact, it is one of the studies 
which provides an analytical approach. 
Another such study is David LeMarquand' s. His work 
although examines the international river basin from a 
geographical perspective, he examines cooperation from an 
international relations perspective. He utilizes the 
concepts of international relations in making his analysis 
for the issues between the US and Canada. He argues that, 
if there is empathy and shared perceptions of problems 
between countries, such as between Canada and the US, 
negotiations tend to be easier. 12 
In relation with these studies, bzden Bilen's studies, 
who is the Deputy Director General of DSI- the General 
Directorate of State Water Works- are worth mentioning. His 
latest study focuses on the supply and demand balance of the 
basin, plus he utilizes technical and scientific approaches 
to serve as an objective guide in comprehending the issues.~ 0 
The common points in all mentioned studies are related 
to their orientation; all studies begin with the concealed 
assumption that, if a conflict is about a natural resource, 
then the work done should entirely be constructed upon the 
peculiar feature of the resource. Another common point, 
9 
!:hev all provide technical data regarding the rivers in 
consideration. However, a close analysis of the works often 
presents inconsistencies 
.Another aspect of these 
they heavily emphasize 
in terms of data 
studies sterns from the 
technical dimension of 
presented. 
fact that 
the water 
co~flict with no reference to the international relations 
a.::a foreign policy element of the issue. 
A second set of studies can be ref erred as the 
approaches adopted in the international conferences convened 
in Turkey. 
Two conferences on the issue and a seminar were 
arranged in Ankara. The title of the first conference held 
a~ Bilkent 
Conference 
University in 
on Transboundary 
1991 is the "International 
Waters in the Middle East: 
Prospects for Cooperation;" the second conference was held 
at: Hacettepe University in 1993 and was titled as "Water as 
an Element of Cooperation and development in the Middle 
East;" and the seminar arranged at Bilkent University in 
1994 was titled "Transboundary Water Courses." In all three 
analytical meetings scholars from different parts of the 
~_idcEe East have contributed with their ideas ranging from 
eco:iorr..ic development to legal dimension and to practical 
solution alternatives. 
The third set of studies are the ones that take into 
account the international relations dimension of the issue. 
The book titled Su 
Conflict, Turkey, 
Sorunu, TU.rkiye 
and the Middle 
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ve Ortadogu (The 
East) involves 
chapters related to the topics in its title. However, 
-;,.;ithin the confines of this study only one chapter deserves 
attention which examines the issue from a strategic concept 
perspective and elaborates on the issue within a theoretical 
framework. The author of the chapter14 says that, the 
strategic terminology would utilize the "water factor" as an 
i~em of leverage. The analytical discussion that the author 
presents is an important contribution to the literature. 
When the analytical studies which are mainly 
international relations oriented are to be evaluated- which 
are rare as stated above- a couple of examples strikes 
attention. Of these studies, two are mainly game theory 
oriented, and they contributed to the analytical exercise 
literature on the water conflict. The first study carried 
out by Peter;Rogers of Harvard University, who examined some 
=udimentary game models, and reached tentative conclusions 
based upon various game theory concepts of stability applied 
co the Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin . 15 The other game theory 
application of the water conflict, between Turkey and Syria, 
is by Serdar Guner of Bilkent University, who utilized the 
game of the War of Attrition, which is a repeated game where 
cooperation is not binding but self-enforced. 16 
Another study carried out as a Ph.D. 
Bilkent University is by Ay$egul Kibaroglu. 
the tension over the allocation of the 
dissertation at 
She argues that 
waters of the 
Euphrates can only be achieved via the establishment of 
institutionalized patterns of cooperation. 
11 
She asserts 
that, Turkey can act as a leader in the emergence of an 
i~~ernational regime with its structural advantages and 
in~ellectual accumulation.17 
A new international relations journal Strateji has 
also reserved one whole issue for water conflict last year. 
A.:.o::g with some review of the conflict studies, a paper 
i::spired from this thesis was developed by Kaynak Acar, 
titled as 11 Stratej ik A<;:1dan Su Sorunu, 11 (The Water Conflict 
From A Strategic Perspective) . 18 
As seen from the above account there are limited 
s-:udies that take into consideration the strategic 
i~portance of the resource and the international relations 
dimension of the conflict. 
The following chapter, 
changes in the international 
presents an account of 
system, and its impact on 
the 
the 
::iefinition of security. The aim of this chapter is to 
::iepict the way water has become an element in foreign policy 
making. 
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CHAPTER III: THE CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND 
IN THE DEFINITION OF SECURITY AND THEIR IMPACT ON FOREIGN 
POLICY MAKING 
3-1 The Change in the International Context and the Need 
for the Inclusion of New Issues in Defining Security 
The objective of this chapter is to address primarily 
d:e '.·:ay water has become an element of foreign policy making 
p;:::-=~icularly in the post-Cold War era. In order to do this, 
fi::-st, the change in the international system, second, the 
expanded concept of security is elaborated. Later, a 
framework for foreign policy making is elucidated by 
emphasizing on the way water has turned out to be an item in 
foreign policy making at the close of the cold war. Here, 
~he importance of conflicts emerging out of water allocation 
problems, and the role of water in the preservation of 
international security are discussed. 
The systemic transformation of international politics, 
started with the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy in 
~he late 1980s, has started a new era in international 
re:ations. The events of the 1989-91 period have moved the 
international system from bipolarity to multipolarity-
al~hough arguments still continue as regards the unipolarity 
c::- ~::e multipolarity of the current system. 1 Parallel to 
~::is development the realist understanding of international 
::-e:ations has been under fierce challenge. 
The realist view of international relations though it 
:acks the competence of providing a framework to match the 
altered or rather expanding range of security issues, it is 
st~ll not negligible that it remains somehow to be the only 
paradigm that purports to explain the insecure nature of the 
anarchic international environment and the behaviour of 
states \·Ji thin it. 2 The point that validates this argument 
can be met by many scholars' reasoning that nations have 
focused their foreign policies on the pursuit of military 
anc cerritorial security. The major contribution of the 
~ealists has been their exclusive focus on nation states as 
both agents and objects of most significant occurrences in 
1110rld politics. What the international relations scholars 
are faced at this stage is centered around a worry about 
state power; the 1990s in fact will be witnessing a 
redefinition of what constitutes national security and how 
states respond to this by understanding what is meant by 
power in the post-cold war era and the ability of different 
types of states to manage the new considerations. New 
definitions of security are of course due to a variety of 
new goals and issues. 
Global developments now suggest the need for another 
a..'1.alogous definition of national security to include 
resource, environmental, and demographic issues.~ The 
growth in interdependence and its importance for the 
maintenance of a sound economy have placed the economic 
relationships between nations in the forefront of the issues 
that are now at the core of foreign policy making. The 
focus on economics has had implications regarding foreign 
policy resources. As Sprout and Sprout 4 have pointed out, 
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as regards the years from the 1970s on, most of the states 
nave been in the process of modernization, which resulted in 
shortages of food, raw materials, and natural resources. So 
the uneven distribution of natural resources coupled with 
economic development which prepared the ground for 
population growth and industrialization have long-range 
~~~ernational implications. 
When the definition of national interests centers on 
protecting and controlling territory, people, and natural 
resources, the military is absolutely important and serves 
as the instrument of final resort. Although it was frank 
that the established definition of security, which took its 
essence from state-centric understanding of world politics 
was begun to be undermined, the end of the cold war paved 
the way for expanding the definition of security. The post-
•realist" analysis shows that more often than not the 
opposite is true. It acknowledges a more inclusive 
definition of security and challenges to security 
encompassing but moving beyond the traditional notion of 
military threat and response. The newer concepts recognize 
the continuing problems associated with military conflict, 
oo~ argue that other factors increasingly threaten the 
sunrivability and coherence of the state- and not the state 
alone. 
Security challenges become more complex when one turns 
to those issues that may not directly challenge the 
viability of the state, in traditional terms, but they may 
15 
nevertheless undermine the sovereignty of the state, 
compromise its ability to control the penetrability of its 
borders, and exacerbate relations whether between groups 
within the polity or between states within the regional or 
global system. 5 So, these emerging trends in international 
security must be addressed systematically. 
Therefore, after remarking this approach, a more 
specific point shall be brought to the fore. Environmental 
changes that began to dominate state agendas slowly taking 
its place among the issues covered by the field of 
international relations. The main reason for this can be 
explained as such; although most of the issues related to 
environmental changes are supposed to be handled as foreign 
policy issues, the established frameworks do not allm·J 
foreign policy makers to perceive the developments as such. 
What this perception brings about is seen in the responses 
given by states to problems directly related to environment 
at different races. They are either viewed as a part of a 
more state oriented nature or just not paid any attention at 
all as a foreign policy matter. The scarcities of vital 
renewable resources such as soil, water, forests, the 
stratospheric ozone layer, and an equable climate 
constitutes the environmental changes. 6 As the conflicts 
that began in many parts of the world due to environmental 
change, it is taken as a possibility to encounter wars over 
natural resources. So, environmental change and violent". 
conflicts are issues that are to be closely related in the 
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forthcoming century. If an account of the causes of 
environmental scarcity is to be made the following figure is 
obtained. 
Economic development has brought about intensely the 
use of natural resources. Human activities can both reduce 
the quantity and degrade the quality of resources faster 
than the resource is renewed. Another point is population 
growth, which can reduce the amount of a renewable resource 
available per person and leads to pollution. 7 Pollution and 
reduction in the quantity comprises the basis for decline in 
food production, economic stagnation and other related 
issues, that threaten the survival of a certain group of 
people or a state per se. And these are really just reasons 
for states to wage wars on the basis of an entirely 
different factor that foreign policy makers never considered 
for a long time. It can be claimed that along with this 
argument that wars have been fought for natural resources in 
the past, i.e., the world is familiar to such an event-even 
wars have been fought with imperial objectives to gain the 
control of certain natural resources. 8 However, the context 
is a little altered on the eve of the 21st century. That is 
to s~y, it was historically there suffering the scarcity of 
certain resources, but carrying it to the top of security 
consideration over the military and territorial ones is 
quite a new development that the states are faced to adjust. 
As mentioned above violent conflicts shall emerge over the 
scarcity of certain resources that are critical to human 
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survival and as they can be physically seized or controlled 
unlike climate change or the problems with the ozone layer. 
The point here is not to claim that, it is plausible to 
expect states to fight wars over scarcities, and that is the 
one and only solution to this problem. On the contrary, the 
point that is to be made here is to underline the importance 
of these scarcities and state that such issues have begun to 
carry such a value that can be comparable to the integrity 
of state. Scholars of international relations addressing 
the security implications of environmental scarcity usually 
.. emphasize the potential for interstate wars. In the mid-
seventies one theory of war arising from resource scarcity 
is provided by Choucri and North. 9 
3 .2 How Water Has Become an Element In Foreign Policy 
Making? 
The patterns, that were used to be utilized for about 
forty-five years in regard to foreign policy making, 
regardless of in which part of the world a country is 
located, have been bewildered. The point that has to be 
highlighted here is that now states do face an enlarged 
range of issues to take into account while formulating their 
foreign policies. The prevailing international environment, 
which has been a bipolar world, of the post-war era had in a 
sense abated states' policy preferences regarding the 
outside world: States except for the United States and the 
Soviet Union were either bound to ally themselves with one 
of the mentioned powers due to their geopolitical 
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situations; they would not be able to escape from the threat 
emanating from the other superpower, which it did not 
consider itself to be closer at the policy formulation 
level, but was so geographically; or 
themselves with one of the powers, 
they preferred to ally 
which was the United 
States in this option, to be able to create a rudeness to 
resist the ideological threat emanating from the Soviet 
Union. Further the latter power's wish to create an 
alliance against the one formulated by the United States. 
The implication of these two alliances has been that of the 
derivation of a securer international system, which was 
labeled as the "bipolar world" in which both superpowers 
were considered to be the guarantors of security by 
providing the small powers upon which they have established 
their entire posture, and which is viewed as the "least 
prone to war international order 1110 by most of international 
relations scholars. In addition, what shall be concluded 
from this type of a security system established was that, it 
enabled the small powers of either bloc to adjust their 
foreign policy goals in accordance with the rules of the 
cold war; their primary concern have come out to be the 
containment of communism and the prevention of the spread of 
capitalism regarding each bloc, establishment of close 
economic ties within each bloc to become qualified to create 
an image of robustness, and trying to get the support of the 
Third World states against the opposite bloc. The system 
established immediately after the Second World War has in a 
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sense made it easier for states to enumerate their foreign 
policy goals and objectives, to fix the limits of their 
power, and finally to define to which direction their 
foreign policies were oriented. 11 
Nevertheless, the mentioned changes in the 
international system and in the definition of security now 
entails that foreign policy formulation of each state 
whether a small or great power has to face the new range of 
issues that were unable to rank among the chief issues of 
foreign policy agendas of states that were occupied first by 
military and then economic considerations for almost half a 
century. Some of these issues were in fact deteriorating 
some states relations with others for a very long period of 
time. What the end of the Cold War has furnished the 
international system shall be found with this viewpoint. 
This can be regarded as a ramification of the end of the 
cold war, yet, an international order raised solely upon 
exclusive threat perception does not only provide the ever 
securest system the world witnessed, but rather a system 
full of hidden conflicts that were unable to born apparently 
and complete their cycles. So, a system experienced, was 
not healthy at all, but was giving the image of the 
healthiest ever. The above enumerated points do not 
submerge the fact that the structure of the international 
system remains much the same, but as mentioned before the 
nature of the competition and the patterns of conflict 
within the system have shifted. 
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Therefore, it can be argued that closer attention must 
be devoted to understand the changing nature of 
interdependence and to compare the meanings of foreign 
policy in worlds where conflicts are mostly emerging on the 
basis of economic factors rather than military. After 
summing up the alterations that came to the fore at the 
international level it would be useful to dwell on foreign 
policy itself. 
Foreign policy can be defined "as the output of the 
state into the global system. 1112 As it is a set of guide to 
choices being made about people, and things beyond the 
boundaries of the state, and "involves the discovery of 
goals as much as it involves using decisions to achieve 
particular outcomes, n 13 the environment within which a state 
functions has a far reaching impact on the formulation of 
foreign policy. When one considers how a policy is 
formulated, it instantly requires the elaboration of what 
can be named as the "foreign policy orientations" of states, 
which enables one to understand, what foreign policy making 
is by focusing on foreign policy objectives and the 
discovery of goals.14 A "foreign policy objective" is 
defined as an "image of a future state of affairs and future 
conditions that governments through individual policy makers 
aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad and by 
changing or sustaining the behaviour of other states. ":: 
Holsti presents a possible scheme for classifying the 
objectives of states, which produces three categories for 
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analyzing them: 16 The "core objectives," to which 
governments commit their very existence and which must be 
achieved at all times; usually related to the survival of 
the state ( territorial integrity, sovereignty) ; "middle-
range objectives," that are less important to decision 
makers such as economic development and social welfare, and 
finally, "long-range objectives," that are of least 
immediacy to decision makers and include plans, and what is 
understood by orientation in the analysis of foreign policy 
making in this study can be given as such: "A state's 
general attitudes and commitments toward the external 
environment and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing 
its domestic and external objectives and for coping with 
persisting threats. 11 17 
The conceptual information on foreign policy enables 
one to locate water in the formulation of foreign policy. 
It is frank to note that, water may almost be characterized 
as a core objective when the an analysis is made for its 
significance vis-a-vis the survival of a state. It is also 
essential to understand the way this item as a core 
objective can influence and/or can take its place in the 
overall foreign policy orientation of a state. Water is one 
of the most decisive new issues in making foreign policy. 
This new foreign policy item tends to be the source of 
conflicts that are most prominently identified by conflicts 
emanating from the allocation of the waters of international 
rivers. 18 
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Water conflict, in this study, is simply defined as a 
conflict emerging from the problem of the allocation of the 
waters of a transboundary river. Although in many parts of 
the world water conflicts have been tried to be solved in 
one way or another, due to the fact that international 
politics is experiencing a time of change, its extent and 
degree of occupying foreign policy agenda has remarkably 
shifted. The conflicts between Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan; 
Syria and Lebanon; Syria and Iraq; Egypt and Sudan; and 
Mexico and the US are just some exemplifies of the conflict 
in the past. The mentioned conflicts were important for the 
countries involved, however, they were not constituting a 
threat for the national security of the states concerned due 
to the Cold War conditions. Still, the conflicts 
experienced portrayed that water as a natural resource has 
turned out to be an item of foreign policy. What the end of 
the Cold War has provided the international relations 
students is that this natural resource is to be handled 
either as a means of cooperation in the track to the 
resolution of conflicts, or their deadlock. This situation 
has attained it with a strategic importance. Therefore, if 
a relationship between states, based on the allocation of 
the waters of a river, is being regarded as a conflict and 
thus enables it to rank at the top of the national security 
agendas of states, strengthens the assumption that water 
should be viewed as a strategic asset and should be treated 
with this understanding in mind. Although it can well be an 
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element of cooperation, it tends to be perceived as an 
element of conflict. This reason for this approach shall be 
understood on grounds that each state is inclined to possess 
as much water as possible due to climatic factors- namely 
the unpredictable outcome of the greenhouse effect, and the 
increasing demand for water in the face of dramatic 
population increase in various parts of the world-. States, 
and in order to guarantee their future as regards the 
mentioned factors and to boost economic development, almost 
in every state through which a river passes, states either 
in consultation with one another or independent of each 
other carry out huge water projects mainly aiming 
agricultural development or energy production. 
Another factor that intensifies water conflicts other 
than allocating its waters, this is peculiar to the case 
when the river in question constitutes a boundary between 
two states, is water diversion. What is meant by water 
diversion is the construction of huge dams to store waters, 
so as to utilize it either for irrigation of huge 
agricultural plains or hydroelectric projects. Of these of 
course the former objective tends to frighten the other 
riparian with the anxiety that what if it does not possess 
enough water for its survival. These points all needs 
further elaboration, but it is not within the framework of 
this chapter to dwell on the water conflict itself. 
However, these basic points indicate that, water as a term 
will be occupying- in fact it began to do so- foreign policy 
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agendas of particular states as it turns out to be one of 
the factors which determine foreign policy objectives in the 
changing international system. 
In the following chapter, foreign policy principles of 
Syria and Turkey will be addressed in order to contextualize 
the water conflict within the complex web of interactions 
between the two states. 
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CHAPTER IV: FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORKS OF TURKEY AND SYRIA 
This chapter addresses a historical account of 
foreign policy principles of Turkey and Syria, and aims to 
contextualize the conflict in consideration, particularly 
within the bounds of the bilateral relations. 
In the first part of this chapter, Turkish foreign 
pol icy is analyzed. The focus of this part is on the 
formulation of the Turkish foreign policy, and its 
development until present time. However, while doing this 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East constitutes 
the core of the chapter as the water conflict with Syria 
arises in this region. 
In the broadest and may be the most correct manner the 
term Middle East covers the subsystem of the Near East, 
North Africa, and the Gulf region. However, as Turkey is in 
closer contact with only a small part of the above indicated 
region, which makes up only the northern part of the Gulf 
region, within the framework of this study, the Middle East 
is used to mean only a couple states composing the northern 
and western line of the Gulf region. The states that fall 
into this category are Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and apart 
from this four states Egypt. In fact, when even this 
particular region is taken into account what is met is not a 
policy developed for this region as a whole, but rather 
specific bilateral relations, and thus specific policies. 
Thus, if a comprehensive statement is to be made it is 
indisputable to state that Turkish foreign policy regarding 
the Middle East is only aimed at the northern part of the 
Gulf region- covering only its southern neighbours plus 
Israel. 
When a state's foreign policy vis-a-vis this region is 
in consideration a number of issues should be taken into 
account prior to a foreign policy review. The nature of the 
region may rank first, and the nature of the leaders of the 
states in the region. It is not deniable that even the name 
of the region in consideration is named by the Western 
states, further the region has been a stage for great power 
rivalry. Following the imperial contest over the region, 
the involvement perpetuated during the Cold War years, and 
no one can claim that it is over. As one scholar asserts 
the Middle East has become "the most penetrated 
international relations subsystem in today's world. "1 The 
decline of the European influence after 1945 resulted in a 
radical transformation in the internal and external 
development of the Middle East and in world politics. The 
new leaders who seized the reins of power in the 1950s were 
much more responsive to indigenous and nationalist sentiment 
than any philosophical creed. 2 They were determined to 
assert their interests and play an active role in regional 
and international affairs. Concurrently, in their search for 
allies and alliances, the superpowers of the post war era 
competed against each other to capture newly emancipated 
states. The Middle East was sucked into the arena of the 
superpower rivalry. 3 The region has been puzzled by complex 
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and ambiguous relationships- both 
regional. The dimensions shall 
international and intra-
inter-Arab relationships, 
those of Arab-superpower. 
be 
anti-Jewish 
generalized namely, 
relationships, and 
4.1 Foreign Policy Framework of Turkey 
In this part, an account of the formulation of the 
Turkish foreign policy from the establishment of the Turkish 
republic onwards is presented. As stated above, the scope 
of the analysis of Turkish foreign policy is limited within 
the framework of the Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East to be able to put forward the bilateral 
relations with Syria in the clearest manner. 
The underpinning feature of the Turkish foreign policy 
until the break out of the Second World War was 
"neutralism." 4 This type of foreign policy anticipates that 
the state will not commit its military capabilities and, 
sometimes, its diplomatic support to the purpose of another 
state. 5 The primary reason for policy determination in this 
direction prior to the brink of the Second World War come 
forth both from international developments and from 
internal requirements. The establishment of the Turkish 
state under the command of Ataturk was determined to escape 
the nature of the state from its eastern outlook, and the 
reforms that were undertaken to carry out this was Western 
oriented in the essence. 6 Further, as his reforms required 
economic recovery strongly to achieve modernization, the 
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state had to kept independent of any states' ambitions i 
what this meant immediately after the First World War was 
following a moderate foreign policy. As one expert states: 
Ataturk's theory and practice of foreign policy 
and the conditions under which the new nation-
state was born have been the most important 
factors shaping Turkish foreign policy over the 
last sixty years. In particular, Turkey's 
foreign policy has been influenced by the 
following principles laid down by Ataturk: the 
goal of establishing a nation-state of the 
nineteenth-century European model with a 
coinciding effort to create a favourable 
position for Turkey in the international system, 
the continuous observance and application of the 
principle of "peace at home and peace in the 
world. "7 
Turkey isolated itself from the European political 
affairs and refrained from dealing with Middle Eastern 
affairs, as they were once under the administration of the 
Ottoman Empire, which was in conformity with the principle 
of "peace at home and peace in the world." Turkey during 
the late 1930s had to make an alteration in its foreign 
policy vis-a-vis the European states. Apart from the Soviet 
threat emanating from its immediate northern border, the 
changes taking place in the external environment looked more 
threatening; developments in Italy and Germany resulted in 
the Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain in 1939 8 , this 
has been the end of the neutralist Turkish foreign policy 
and it tended to favour a pro-western foreign policy. As 
Turkey's primary objective has been not only keeping Turkey 
away from foreign involvements, but also strongly furnishing 
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economic development, adopting a pro-western foreign policy 
was profitable both on security terms and on getting 
economic assistance from the United States. Although 
Turkey's independence was in a sense was strictly limited, 
in one expert's terms: "There was a high degree of 
coincidence between Turkish and American security interests, 
the common objective being the deterrence of the Soviet 
threat and the containment of the Soviet expansion. "9 The 
policy of creating an alliance with the West was also a 
direct outcome of what can be named as the impact of history 
on Turkish foreign policy; as the Russian Empire had always 
constituted an immediate threat to the Ottoman Empire, 
Turkey at the time viewed the Soviet Union from the same 
angle .10' 11 Since the late 1930s and particularly with the 
mid-1940s Turkey could no longer remained isolated from the 
international developments; the features of its strategic 
location, and changes in international security resulted in 
a change in Turkey's foreign policy. The driving force for 
Turkey to be involved in an alliance can reasonably be 
understood by the definition provided by Holsti for 
"alliance construction" which is one of the foreign policy 
orientations that he has identified: "Governments that seek 
to construct permanent diplomatic coalitions or military 
alliances assume that they cannot achieve their objectives, 
defend their interests, or deter perceived threats by 
mobilizing their own capabilities. "12 Thus states facing 
similar external problems or sharing similar objectives 
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rely upon each other and make commitments. The United 
States was meeting the expectations 
after the war; Turkey had to be 
of Turkey immediately 
supported against the 
Soviet Union, which was the closest state to the Soviet 
Union that can be relied upon, and also it was the state who 
could guarantee Western interests in the Middle East as a 
stabilizer where both superpowers had conflicting interests. 
The Truman Doctrine of 1947 was the clearest sign of United 
States policy regarding Turkey that can be viewed as a 
declaration of the support of Turkey against the Soviet 
Union. 13 
In order to be able to grasp the founding principles 
of Turkish foreign policy one has to consider the country's 
situation in the light of many considerations, however, 
geographic location, perceptions of threat, national needs, 
and systemic characteristics may be the most important. 
Turkey's adoption of an exclusively Western oriented foreign 
policy had come to the fore when its admission into the NATO 
was materialized in the year 1952. 1 4• 15 Hence, by 
guaranteeing its status in such a conflictual and 
venturesome part of the world, as of 1952, military threats 
and burdens began to be shared within the framework of the 
alliance. 
The international system emerged immediately after the 
Second World War was a bipolar system in which the two 
superpowers have been able to magnify the bipolarity of the 
global system by allying to themselves many small states 
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through NATO, which provided the security and foreign policy 
objective of the United States; 
Union within the confines of 
that of keeping the Soviet 
the Eastern Europe, and 
preventing the spread of 
world; the Warsaw Pact, 
communism to other parts of 
formulated to execute just 
the 
the 
opposite of what the NATO called for; and several other 
alliances. What the bipolar system has brought about to 
inter-state affairs has been characterized by a threat 
emanating from the Soviet Union: A pattern of adversarial 
politico-military pattern has been established on the axis 
of East-West relationship. What Turkey was expected to 
perform has been to deter any Soviet action in the Eastern 
Mediterranean; keeping it beyond the limits of the Middle 
East, which has been a region of instability and was best 
known with its entire posture as an anti-Western front. 
However, Turkish foreign policy of neutrality both in the 
affairs of Europe and the Middle East has been perplexed by 
the beginning of the post-war era. Turkish policy of trying 
to keep the Middle East from the Soviet influence has been 
criticized by all of the states of the region regardless of 
their approach to the policies of the Western bloc. ir: The 
chief determinant of Turkish foreign policy has been that of 
formulating a security policy within the NATO alliance, 
which was regarded by the alliance members as a 
strategically important actor for the defense of Western 
security due to its geopolitical characteristics, and its 
position within the Middle East. 17 However, apart from 
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formulating a foreign policy in conformity with the features 
of its faithful ally role, and orientation towards the 
United States and Western Europe, it lacked a concrete 
foreign policy vis-a-vis the closest region, which in fact 
Turkey has been a part at least on geographical terms, if 
not on political and international relations terms. The 
lack of a policy regarding such an unstable region made it 
easier for the Turkish foreign policy makers to comprehend 
any development within the confines defined by its alliance 
membership, and an extension of its policy vis-a-vis the 
West and containment of the Soviet threat. Certainly, the 
principles of Turkish foreign policy, which were formulated 
in the first half of the 1960s, refined it without leaving 
any skepticism that Turkey would not combine any of its 
policies by taking into account the Middle East, it would 
refrain. The principles of Turkish foreign policy, which 
are later named as the "traditional principles of Turkish 
foreign policy," has two essential points: 18 
• The first principle corresponded directly to the 
Middle East; Turkey would not interfere in the affairs of 
the Middle Eastern states with each other, which was to be 
carried out by the formerly established principle of non-
interference of the affairs of them with Europe. 
• The second principle made it clear that Turkey would 
be anxious concerning its role within the Western alliance 
and the role it played as a NATO member for the utmost care 
not to harm its relations with other regional actors. 
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The implication of the formulation of these two 
essential principles has been that of providing a refined 
outlook for the implementation of Ataturk's foreign policy, 
which has been formulated around the principle of "peace at 
home and peace in the world. 111 9 
The 1960s has witnessed a break in Turkish foreign 
policy as far as its firm collaboration with the Western 
bloc is considered. The dominating reasons for a novelty in 
its foreign policy have been the differences that came out 
between the United States and Turkey regarding their 
approaches to the Cyprus question, which has been a direct 
outcome of the struggle with Greece vis-a-vis the issue; 
further, to assemble the support of the Arab states which 
constituted the essence of the Middle East along with 
Israel. However, Turkey was aware of the problem that it 
recognized Israel as a state, and it was still an ally of 
the West. Still Turkey in demand to gather the common 
conviction that it was not acting against the Arab states, 
its behaviour was not in support of only Israel. 20 The 
reason for why Turkey could not follow a coherent foreign 
policy towards this region shall be grasped by emphasizing 
the main pillars which jeopardize the political structure of 
the region as a whole. 
The instability in the region was based on the fact 
that there were internal problems within each Middle Eastern 
state, since they were able to gain their independence from 
the Western powers late in the 1940s or early in the 1950s, 
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apart from this their relations with one another and with 
Israel in general and with this state at the inter-state 
level was conflictual . What the maJor foreign policy goal 
of these states was the destruction of the state of Israel 
from the region. Hence, it was almost impossible for Turkey 
to follow a "future-oriented" and "stable foreign policy" 
towards the region. The essential factor that directed its 
foreign policy towards this region has been found in its 
unquestioning alignment with the West; it regarded the NATO 
alliance as an extension of the United States foreign 
policy, and likewise it regarded its Middle East policy as 
the policy that was to be carried out as an extension of its 
alignment with the West. 
Therefore, the move from one dimensional foreign 
policy to the one which offered increased expedient options 
was recorded. The adjustment brought about by this new era 
in the Turkish foreign policy was prominently marked by not 
the deterioration of the a shift in its defense 
arrangements, but was prominently marked by an addition of 
diplomatic component. An expert's views concerning this 
period can be given as such: 
Concluding that hostile relations, particularly 
with the Soviet Union, exacerbated mutual 
security concerns and delayed the development of 
mutual confidence, she reoriented her 
exclusively pro-Western foreign policy towards 
one which was more "multi-faceted," which meant 
above all the improvement of relations with 
neighbours and a more active interest in and an 
independent attitude towards world politics. 21 
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What this new process has brought about is a move 
towards the reduction in the degree of its isolation in the 
Middle East. Turkey's confrontation with the Arab support 
for the Greeks on the Cyprus issue neither led to a 
rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states nor a cessation 
of relations with the West. Turkey has guaranteed its place 
on the international scene with the NATO and non-involvement 
of the affairs of the Middle Eastern states. As one expert 
states; 
... al though geography cannot be regarded as an 
absolute item in determining threatening 
sources, ... it turns out to be a formidable 
factor in perceiving threats. Turkey, though 
being a member of the Western alliance, has an 
important place in the Middle Eastern sub-system 
in terms of geography and historical 
background ... 22 
Turkey continued its relations with the Middle Eastern 
states on the accepted principles, however, being aware of 
its importance in the region, the leading medium of 
relations has turned out to be intense economic relations 
with the regional states.23 Other than agreements on 
economic issues it continued to secure its interests in the 
region by the framework provided by the Western alliance, 
and reciprocally the alliance's interests are preserved in 
the region. 
Until the end of the Gulf War the Turkish interests 
have coincided with those of the leading partner in the 
Western alliance. The collaboration with the United States 
during the Gulf War served the Turkish ends as well. 
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However, with the demise of the Soviet threat Turkey's 
security consideration has shifted from the one that was 
there for a couple of decades ago. What this entails is the 
fact that, at present Turkish national interests do not 
necessarily coincide with those of the NATO powers. 2~ In 
this new era, Turkey has faced with new security 
considerations. The demise of a formidable enemy entails 
that this state should consider more seriously the new 
security questions in its doorstep, plus it should take its 
place in the new security formulations. 
One significant point regarding Turkey's standing in 
the international system is closely related in its Western-
oriented foreign policy framework, and in providing its 
security within a framework guaranteed with relation to 
Europe. The threats challenging the Atlantic Alliance in 
general have diversified in recent years. As on expert 
accounts on the problems faced by the Alliance have effects 
on Turkish security considerations. 
The most likely contingencies are no longer 
those that occur between two opposing blocs, 
namely NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. Instead, 
the major area of conflict has shifted from 
Europe to the Third World, including the Middle 
East and southwest Asia. Paralleling this 
development, indirect strategies, low intensity 
operations, economic and ideological techniques 
of influence, and terrorism have become more 
prominent. . .. -and eventually even the major 
roles- are likely to be played by local actors, 
and the conflicts may well depend on regional 
factors. In such a context, Western Europe has 
an undeniable interest in preventing 
instabilities in the Middle East and the Persian 
Gulf. 25 
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When the security dimension of Turkey is considered, 
it is definite that Europe and the United States would like 
to see a stable Turkey and a stable Middle East. 'Turkey 
being a state with close relations with the European Union-
which has become a member of the Customs Union- and thus 
becoming 
being a 
an element in European economic 
neighbour state to the Middle 
formulation, 
East, the 
and 
last 
European contact state to the region, it carries a role of 
preserving European interests in the region, and that of the 
only functioning democracy in the region. Therefore, Turkey 
still has a role within NATO as important as the Cold War 
years, however, apart from this dimension, it has to 
guarantee its 
sources by 
security within 
finding new 
a more diversified conflict 
creating alliances, and 
interdependence within the new strategic environment. 
Current developments show that, Turkey's traditional 
policy towards the region cannot match the problems of the 
current as it has been a policy of non-involvement and 
providing security. Further, the lack of long-range goals 
makes it difficult to conduct relations with the states in 
the region. The only accountable relations with the 
regional states are those economic ones. However, the 
hostile formulations emanating in the region makes it 
imperative to get involved in the politics of the Middle 
East. Recently, Syria's approach towards Turkey has been 
considered by the Turkish decision makers a threat to its 
security and existence of the state of Turkey. 
38 
Therefore, 
the developments in the region indicate that Turkey will 
take a more relevant position vis-a-vis the region to impede 
any further contradictory formulations hurting its national 
security interests. The recent Israeli-Turkish Defense 
Accord shall be viewed from the regional dynamics angle as a 
step to achieve this. According to Turkish officials Syria 
security environments of both Israel damages the 
and Turkey. 
organizations 
national 
The shelter provided by 
working against the both 
Syria 
states 
to terrorist 
led in the 
formulation of one voice between the two states to confront 
the support of international terrorism. Although the Accord 
of 1996 is perceived by the Arab states as a source of 
division in the region and protested mainly by Syria and 
Egypt, the one and only goal is cooperation between the two 
states in military training. Of course, this cooperation 
disturbs primarily Syria, however, it shall be demonstrated 
by signing this Accord that, the support for separatist 
movements from this time on will be responded in a 
diplomatic manner. The support to the Turco-Israeli Accord 
received mainly from the United States show that, the 
security of both Turkey and Israel are vital for regional 
stability. Therefore, Syrian policy of supporting PKK 
activities in Turkey in search for connecting the water 
issue in a bargaining setting, and aiming to compel Turkey 
to sign a water sharing agreement, seems from this time on 
quite difficult to achieve. The reason for reaching this 
conclusion lies in the fact that, with this Accord-
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particularly with Israel with which state Turkey finds 
itself isolated from the region, and shares a common 
threatening element- Turkey being a neutral state tm·Jards 
the region now turns out to be an active actor in regional 
affairs, and perceives a role to be played in securing its 
national interests. 
4.2 Foreign Policy Framework of Syria 
The foremost principle of Syrian foreign policy can be 
characterized as it has ultimately rooted in the historical 
frustration of Syrian nationalist aspirations by Western 
imperialism. 26 
In the wake of the 1917 Arab revolt, Syrians expected 
the creation of an independent Arab state in historic Syria2 7 
linked to a wider Arab federation. Instead what they 
engaged in have been the dismemberment of historic Syria 
into four parts; Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. 
Further, the establishment of the state of Israel was 
provided in Palestine. 28 What this dismemberment has brought 
about fixed the foreign policy agenda of the Syrian state, 
i.e., its separation from Jordan, Lebanon, and the Arab 
world proved irreversible; 
on Syria's doorstep, and 
national aspirations, thus 
Israel became a formidable enemy 
a permanent obstacle to its 
the resulting powerful brew of 
anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, 
sentiment has imparted an 
irredentist thrust to Syrian 
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pan-Arab, 
enduring 
foreign 
and pan-Syrian 
revisionist and 
policy. This 
revisionism reached a climax in the effort of the radical 
wing of the Baath party between 1966 and 1970 to make 
Damascus the bastion of a pan-Arab revolution and a war of 
liberation in Palestine. This, however, brought on the 1967 
defeat and the Israeli occupation of new Arab lands, 
including the Golan Heights. This def eat generated intense 
new security fears in Syria, and gave new roots to 
revisionism, and further locked Syria into the conflict with 
Israel. 
The 1967 defeat brought the high costs of messianic 
revisionism and provoked the rise to power of Hafiz Al-
Assad, a leader who was prepared to chart a more realistic 
course matching Syrian objectives and means. 
Syria's objectives29 as follows: 
He scaled down 
• the recovery of the occupied territories; 
• defense of the Syrian state; 
• enhancement of its stature in the Arab world; 
• upgradement of Syrian capabilities. 
It is also essential to assess what type of a role the 
Syrian state has played with this core foreign policy 
objectives in mind has to be determined in understanding the 
forthcoming ones. A national role conception includes the 
policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of 
decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their 
state, and of the functions, if any, their state should 
perform on a continuing basis in the international system or 
in subordinate regional systems. 
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In his analysis Holsti in 
determining the Syrian role conception he enumerates five 
conceptions related to this state, namely, as an anti-
imperialist agent; liberator-supporter; regional-subsystem 
collaborator; independent; and faithful ally. 3c What this 
classification reinforces also is that, Assad in scaling 
down the objectives of the state he has been determined to 
reach these goals. It is also a very well knowri fact that 
Assad as leader, turned out to be a landmark in Syrian 
foreign policy, and his personality plays a crucial role in 
attaining Syrian objectives.31 
thus Syrian foreign policy's 
As mentioned above his 
main thrust has 
and 
been 
irredentism. According to one observer, 32 Assad has pursued 
the goal of recovering the lost territories through a 
strategy of interchangeable alliances. Assad has a 
reputation in the region for "intricate maneuvers combining 
daring action with a desire to take minimal risks. n33 The 
primarily observed line that Assad followed is that he 
evidences an active-independent orientation to a large array 
of foreign policy problems, particularly those relating to 
Syria's role in the Middle East. He continually monitors 
his environment, checking where his position receive 
support, and 
environmental 
generally choosing to act only when the 
evidence reinforces his judgments or when 
there is a relatively low risk alternative available. Thus, 
although to outside observers Assad's behaviour often seems 
unpredictable, his actions become easier to understand if we 
juxtapose what we assume are Assad's positions with the 
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information from the environment at the moment. Although it 
is not a disregarded fact that the personality of Assad 
still plays a crucial role in Syria's standing on the world 
stage, Syria's failure to become a Soviet proxy34 in the 
Middle East, by 1990, in the Gulf Crisis and War of 
1990/1991, Syria's participation in the anti-Iraqi coalition 
reflected its generally pragmatic policy approach, leads one 
to assess the entire foreign policy standing as it is not as 
unyielding as it gives such an image. 
After giving a general review of its foreign policy 
orientation which primarily focused on Israel, and the 
unification of historic Syria, it is also important to frame 
the bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria. Turkey 
for many years have not been central to foreign policy 
making in Syria, except for the Hatay dispute. Since Syria 
lacked an intense interaction with Turkey in its foreign 
policy formulation, relations do attract attention when it 
is only taken from a Turkish perspective. When the 
bilateral relations is examined it is frank that, Syrian-
'I'urkish relations have long been corroded by this dispute. 
Hatay was awarded to Turkey by Franco-Turkish agreement and 
a plebiscite in 1939 but is still claimed by Syria as its 
rightful territory. 3:; This issue being an element of a 
three-way dispute between the two countries continues to 
have a volume in the bilateral relations which has in fact 
been a part of the irredentist policy. 
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The second issue being the water issue itself requires 
no elaboration within this chapter as a chapter on the issue 
is following. 
The third issue which affects the bilateral relations 
is the alleged support provided by Syria for terrorist 
activities in Turkey. According to the Turkish claims, as 
part of its general anti-western orientation, and specific 
grievances with Turkey in particular, Syria, for several 
decades, 
Ankara, 
has supported political movements hostile to 
including three of Turkey's most dangerous 
opponents: The Armenian Marxist terrorist organization 
ASALA, radical Kurdish groups, and Turkish leftist radicals. 
Turkish state have claimed that, all have had operational 
and training bases in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley in 
Lebanon, from which they have conducted anti-Turkish 
operations. Similarly, in this view, Syria has periodically 
used its support for the PKK in particular as a regular 
instrument of pressure against Turkey. Therefore, from the 
Turkish perspective, the relations between the two countries 
is tense not on due to clear-cut conflicts between the two 
countries, but rather utilization of certain issues as 
instruments of pressure against Ankara. 
In the following chapter the dynamics of the water 
conflict is examined in detail. A descriptive account of 
the factors that contribute to the formulation of the 
conflict is given and the positions taken by the parties 
vis-a-vis the conflict are enumerated. 
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CHAPTER V: THE WATER CONFLICT BETWEEN SYRIA AND TURKEY 
The objective of this chapter is to address the 
dynamics of the water conflict between Syria and Turkey. An 
account of the conflict; positions held by the parties; 
and the International Law dimension of the conflict are the 
three parts that form this section. 
5 .1 The Dynamics of the Water Conflict Between Syria and 
Turkey 
The water conflict between Syria and Turkey, though 
have been on the agenda of both states since the mid-1970s, 
to top the foreign policy agendas of both states twenty 
years ago. Water being a natural resource and being a part 
of the geo-politics of a state, further being an 
environmental element, it indispensably turned out to be an 
issue threatening international security. It is not 
entirely a new issue in the security studies to include 
environmental factors to the studies of international 
conflict and cooperation and reserving local and global 
attention. Harold and Margaret Sprout identified the 
environment as one factor that influences a nation's foreign 
policy . 1 As mentioned earlier water has become an element 
of foreign policy making for both states. Moreover, water 
and peace are very much entangled among the states of the 
Middle East region. 
The water conflict between Turkey and Syria stems from 
the development of an ambitious water supply scheme, called 
the GAP 2 , by Turkey over the rivers of the Euphrates and 
Tigris, and the Syrian anxieties for the rapid and vast 
development of Turkey in the realm of economics almost 
guaranteed by the realization of this project. Conflict, 
although being almost twenty years old, it does not capture 
international attention yet. The reason for this may be 
found in the fact that, no clear-cut shortages regarding the 
flow of the Euphrates are recorded, further, the two states 
involved in the issue do not come together to raise their 
points. 
The conflict between the two states contains several 
dimensions: 
• The conflict can be characterized as a new conflict 
when compared with other conflict over the utilization of 
waters of rivers: It flourished twenty years ago; 
• the linkage established between the water conflict 
and the support provided by Syria to PKK terrorism in Turkey 
as argued by the Turkish authorities; 
• the international law dimension carries a 
significant standing as it leaves Turkey to the conflict 
with full power while leaving Syria to dwell on some other 
insinuations of international law- attains it a different 
character in understanding the dynamics of the conflict. 
5.2 A Brief Account of the Conflict and the Positions Held 
by the Parties 
The background for the conflict can be summarized as 
such: The construction of the Keban Dam on the Euphrates in 
1964 has begun, and completed in the mid-1970s. The 
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underpinning feature of this conflict can be found on this 
very development. 
The underlying factor 
conflict is the development 
in the emergence 
of the GAP, which 
of 
has 
this 
been 
primarily launched to meet Turkey's growing energy 
consumption. Turkey, though since the late 1950s 
constructed hydroelectric dams on its major rivers, almost a 
quarter of Turkey's electricity production has until 
recently been dependent on imported fuel, further, from time 
to time Turkey has also had to import electricity from the 
Soviet Union and Bulgaria to compensate for the shortfalls 
in production. 3 So, the Euphrates featured prominently to 
be the scene to produce the necessary electricity as pointed 
out in footnote 2. Following the Keban dam, the Karakaya 
dam was built between 1976 and 1987. Of course, the 
increase in the number of constructed dams, multiplied 
anxieties across the region: The number of dams which 
reaches to 22 when the entire project was completed, in 
fact, alarmed Syria and Iraq and so was the area that was to 
be irrigated. The magnitudes naturally lead both states to 
the idea that Turkey will leave them with very little water. 
These views intensified particularly when Turkey in 1990 
completed the Ataturk Dam- the greatest dam of the entire 
project. 4 The most highlighting problems emerged during the 
period when the reservoir of the dam was to be filled in the 
early 1990. This year has been the turning point in the 
entire cycle of the emergence of the conflict as the most 
47 
important concerns are raised during that period. Though 
Turkey informed both Syria and Iraq that it would divert the 
Euphrates between January 13 and February 13, 1990, both 
states utilized this procedure as a matter of maneuver in 
the Arab world just to gain international support for anti-
GAP views and to present Turkey as if it was aiming an 
antagonistic approach. Syria was, in fact, 
in its anti-GAP campaign in the Arab world, 
fact that, in calculation it received more 
Euphrates if there had been no diversion 
quite successful 
in spite of the 
water from the 
at all: Syria 
would receive 120m3/sec water from the tributaries below the 
dam during the impoundment, likewise in its notes Turkey not 
only explained the technical reasons for the move, but also 
what measures it would take to prevent any possible adverse 
effects on Syria and Iraq. Turkey stated that it would 
release 750m3/sec water before the January 13 cutoff. 
However, Turkey raised the flow to 800m3 /sec and two weeks 
before the impoundment to 1000m3/sec, so as not to 
antagonize its neighbors. 5 
The impoundment of the reservoir of the Ataturk Dam 
has been the turning point in the evolution of this 
conflict. Syria felt insecure from that time on, regarded 
Turkey as a foe more than ever before. Each and every 
development on the project disturbed Syria, though technical 
committee meetings were planned to gather regularly and the 
meetings between the top officials of the two states are 
almost countless by the time being. At this stage of the 
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conflict, Syria prefers not to join the technical committee 
meetings, or any other conferences arranged to form a milieu 
to discuss the issue. The initiatives proposed by the 
Turkish state remained unanswered though they call for 
cooperation in many respects: The General Directorate of 
State Water Works has studied on the technical aspects of 
the Euphrates and Tigris basin in order to implement one of 
Turkish state's propositions to solve the water conflict. 6 
Another initiative by Turkey has been the Peace 
Water Project. A project developed for the carrying of 
water from the rivers of Seyhan and Ceyhan to the Persian 
Gulf States in the East, and to Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast 
in the West. The pipelines could supply water to Syria, 
Iraq, Jordan, and Israel. But this time, except for Israel, 
the .whole regional states objected to this on grounds that, 
none of them wanted to become dependent on neither to Turkey 
nor to Israel on such a vital resource as water. 
The top level statesmen meetings are now countless, 
although these are made to stop Syrian support for terrorist 
activities in Turkey, water question has always been on the 
top of the agendas too. Further, what the Turkish officials 
continually repeated is that, from the Turkish perspective, 
water has not been regarded as a mater of leverage. Turkish 
perception of the issue is that, the conflict is a product 
of Syrian activities in the international scene to curb the 
accomplishment of the GAP. Iraq, prior to the Second Gulf 
War, was also disturbed by the GAP project and acted 
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harmoniously 
beginnings 
with 
of the 
Syria. While 
f lourishrnent 
Syria since the 
of this project-
very 
the 
construction of the Keban Dam- supported 
be able to 
separatist 
movements in Turkey in order to 
Turkish state both economically 
situation is claimed by Turkey. 
and 
weaken 
politically; 
the 
this 
Syrian officials reject this situation, but also 
accept that there are infiltrations from the Syrian 
territories to that of Turkish and they cannot prevent it. 
However, Syria cannot also prevent to be enlisted among the 
states which support international terrorism. Syria being a 
supporter of international terrorism, according to Turkish 
claims, supported either leftist separatist organizations, 
or Armenian terrorist organizations, and finally the PKK 
activities in Turkey. 
Apart from the objections it raises against the GAP, 
Syria itself exploits the waters of another river; the 
Orontes river. Although it is an international river 
passing through Lebanon, Syria, and finally Turkey, Syria 
utilizes all of its waters. In the recent years, it has 
been recorded that Turkey can no longer benefit from the 
waters of the Orontes. Turkey perceives this as a point to 
indicate what the Syrian intentions are in the essence. 
Another friction point between Syria and Turkey is 
over the city of Hatay. Hatay, inhabited by Arabs and 
Turks, decided to unite with Turkey in 1939. However, the 
Syrians could never accept this secession, though the 
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inhabitants decided to unite with Turkey by themselves. 
Still, it is a fact that, on the Syrian maps Hatay is shown 
as a city of Syria, and they declare that the Turkish 
sovereignty over Hatay is illegitimate. 
The main point that is underlined by the Turkish 
officials is that, Syria in fact, do not only deal with the 
Euphrates, but has been organizing a systematic 
deterioration policy vis-a-vis Turkey from many angles. The 
main premise of the Syrian policy has been to weaken Turkey, 
and prevent its rise as a regional power. The most clear 
indication of this project shall be found through the false-
promises they have given since the mid-1980s to the top 
level government officials of Turkey regarding the 
infiltration of terrorists from the Syrian territories to 
Turkey. Although the Syrian government has guaranteed 
countless times that they will deport terrorist camps from 
their territory or from territories that are under Syrian 
control, these promises seem to be valid only for a very 
short period of time. 
Turkey claims that it has showed all its benevolence 
to find a kind of solution to the water shortages of its 
southern neighbours, and all other Middle Eastern states, 
and presented all the possible cooperation tendencies. In 
Turkish view, in the last decade there have been 15 
tripartite meetings to gather technical information and 
settle the issue on a reasonable ground. However, either of 
the parties (Syria and Iraq) were either not joining the 
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meetings or were not providing the necessary information. 
Turkey, knew that both states were using extremely backward 
methods for irrigation, thus wasting a great amount of 
water, and arranged those meetings to overcome 
problems, but were not utilized as they ought to be. 
5.3 International Law Dimension 
such 
International Law dimension can be regarded as another 
source of the conflict between the two countries. Along 
this line, one specific problematic issue is closely related 
to the way parties define the status of the Euphrates. 
Turkey defines the Euphrates as a transboundary river 
since its sources are in Turkey, and 98% of the river is fed 
by the little streams in Turkey, but then flows to Syria, 
then Iraq. But, Syria defines the Euphrates as an 
international river. 
Helsinki Rules on the uses of. the waters of 
international rivers, and the UN/ILC's Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of international watercourses both state 
that "each basin state furnish relevant and reasonably 
available information to the other basin state concerning 
the waters of a drainage basin within its territory and its 
use of, and activities with respect to such waters.·~ 
Although Syria claims that the Euphrates is an international 
river, according to Turkey, it never fulfills the 
requirements stated in 
technical consultation 
the mentioned 
meetings. In 
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article even for 
addition, Helsinki 
Rules also states that disputes should be resolved by 
negotiation.B 
The ILC has no reference to the resolution of 
disputes, but states that states shall cooperate on the 
basis of sovereign equality. Both the ILC and Helsinki 
Rules take the sharing of the river in consideration as a 
basis which is certainly against the Turkish standing. 
Since there is no sanctions in the international law, and 
many points are not clear enough regarding this watercourses 
issue, each state in line with its own perception can 
identify a river as it requires. An international 
watercourse is defined in UN/ILC Law as "a watercourse, 
parts of which are situated in different states." And a 
watercourse means "a system of surf ace 
waters constituting, 
relationship, a unitary 
by virtue of 
and underground 
their physical 
whole and flowing into common 
terminus." Therefore, none of these statements are in fact 
binding, but in line with the general trend in international 
law, they give advises to states in consideration and 
underlines cooperation and consultation. These are points 
that are already have been the part of the Turkish policy 
regarding both Syria and Iraq. However, Turkish foreign 
policy regarding the status of the Euphrates and Tigris has 
been in a different track though not undermining the 
positions of the co-riparians, but just releasing itself 
from the condition of sharing the waters of these rivers. 
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Turkey as stated above, has described the Euphrates 
and the Tigris as transboundary rivers. 9 In a transboundary 
river there is no recognition of the notion of co-ownership 
or common dominium of a transboundary river or a system by 
the riparian states. On the contrary, there is confirmation 
that each state maintains full sovereignty over the portion 
of the river situated in its own territory. In the 
transboundary case just like in the international river 
case, there is agreement that the exercise of such national 
sovereignty and consequently the unilateral utilization of 
water should be done in an equitable and reasonable manner, 
without, however, causing appreciable harm to other riparian 
states. The only difference comes about with regard to the 
sharing of the waters of the river. 
Syrian . . main premise in resolving the water conflict 
has been to make Turkey to sign a water sharing agreement. 
However, Turkey by not accepting the Euphrates as an 
international river does not see it necessary to sign such 
an agreement on grounds that almost 100% of the waters of 
the river is from Turkey, and thus it does not gain an 
international river feature. It is a river of the Turkish 
territory, but flows into Syria, thus gains a transboundary 
river feature, and this is the official Turkish policy 
regarding this issue. 
Turkey's standing on accepting this river as a 
transboundary one stems from the following: Water has 
turned out to be such a valuable asset that no state on the 
54 
Syria. The only friction point between the two countries is 
the signing of an agreement of sharing. 
In the following chapter, the application of game 
theory to this conflict from the Turkish perception angle is 
made. However, first, the Turkish perception of the foreign 
policy options in the water conflict is analyzed, and then, 
the game used to model the Turkish perception of the water 
conflict is described with its setting. Following these 
parts, the application section with its implications is 
developed. 
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CHAPTER VI: AN APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO THE WATER 
CONFLICT BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA FROM THE TURKISH 
PERCEPTION 
6.1 Turkish Perception of the Current Situation 
The objective, in this part, is to clarify the Turkish 
perception of the current situation as regards the water 
conflict. The account given in this part constitutes the 
core presentation of the conflict from the Turkish viewpoint 
so as to ease the way for the utilization of the game 
theoretical framework. The significance regarding this part 
sterns from the fact that, the points discussed in this part 
are the factors that shape the formulation of the Turkish 
foreign policy regarding the issue. 
The water conflict, from the Turkish perception, is 
mainly due to the different definitions of the status of the 
Euphrates river in terms of international law, and 
accordingly Turkey's unwillingness to sign a water sharing 
agreement with Syria. The entire foreign policy stance is 
built upon this factor, and the whole related issues are 
examined by focusing on this base. 
The water conflict emerged almost twenty years ago, 
however, it can be argued that, it took its current nature 
by the year 1990, when the filling of the reservoir of the 
Ataturk Darn created a tension between the two states. Then, 
the conflict began to be perceived as such for the first 
time in its current meaning. However, any arguments related 
to the release of more water as claimed by Syria, 1 were not 
responded positively by Turkey. 'I"he medium of the 
relationship between the two states from that time on has 
been on mutual allegations, which is based on the 
conflictual history of the bilateral relations. Turkey from 
1990 on continued to underline that Syria supports terrorist 
activities in Turkey by providing them shelter on its 
territory or on territories under its control, and likewise, 
Syria underlined that, they would be suffering at the utmost 
level when the entire water project is completed by Turkey. 
The current situation in the conflict as regards the 
foreign policy options of states from the Turkish perception 
can be summarized as such: 
At the current situation Turkey perceives that, it 
acts in the most cooperative manner while Syria lacks such a 
tendency. According to the Turkish claims, Syria rather 
tries to weaken Turkey from the inside by providing shelter 
for PKK camps on territories under Syrian control. 2 
Therefore, the Turkish perception of the issue is centered 
around the view that, Turkey fulfills its duty regarding the 
1987 Protocol, which is a cooperative approach and the fair 
resolution of the issue. However, in response to such a 
cooperative approach Turkey perceives that Syria does not 
present a friendly approach by supporting terrorist 
activities in Turkey when combined with its standing 
regarding the Hatay dispute and the Orontes conflict. 
The current situation in the conflict is perceived by 
Turkey as it fulfills its commitment to the 1987 Protocol, 
but such a cooperative approach is responded by the Syrian 
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support for PKK terrorism in Turkey. Turkish foreign policy 
on this issue faced a domestic questioning of its 
credibility vis-a-vis Syria. Turkey only receives an 
increase in PKK activities carried out in Turkey, and thus, 
major domestic instability is fortified by the Syrian 
policies. On the other hand, the Syrian position in the 
current situation is interpreted by Turkey as the 
achievement of Syrian hostile policies towards Turkey. This 
simplification can be elaborated as such: The hostile 
bilateral relations can be continued by such a policy by the 
Syrian side. It continues to follow a policy which weakens 
Turkey from the inside. Further., it continues to receive 
the agreed amount of water which deemed to be fair. 
Although the Syrian policy for weakening Turkey and 
receiving water at the amount stated in the Protocol, are 
policies that seem to be a success for the Syrian ends, when 
the changes in the international system and the way 
international relations is conducted is taken into account, 
they do not match with the requirements of the international 
order of the late 1990s. 
Supporting PKK terrorism in Turkey at the expense of 
Turkish compliance with the terms of the Protocol results in 
two major drawbacks for Syria as a member of the 
international system: 
states which support 
First, it is enumerated among the 
international terrorism, 
continues to lose its international credibility. 
thus, 
Second 
drawback is an aftermath of the first one, which might 
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result in the isolation of the state of Syria in the 
international arena. These points are significant 
determinants of the Turkish perception of the current 
situation and the following account elaborates it. 
When Turkey considers itself in the new international 
system it concludes that, its standing in the international 
arena is definite and it receives no suspicion regarding its 
foreign policy orientation or at least as a member of the 
international system. From this perspective an account as 
regards the Syrian situation both in the Middle East, and in 
the international system can be given as such: It cannot be 
denied that, Turkey has lost its trusting among the Middle 
Eastern states following the second Gulf War. As one expert 
stated, Post-Persian Gulf War Iraq has an additional 
grievance against Turkey, i.e., the active Turkish 
contribution to the US-led coalition against Iraq. Though 
Syria has lost Iraq as an ally in the struggle against 
·Turkey on the water issue, it is in a position to harm 
Turkish interests by indirect means in peacetime. 3 Though 
Syria being almost lonely for a well-defined policy 
regarding the water issue, it as a neighbour of Turkey is in 
a major effort ·to acquire weapons of mass destruction, 
possibly including a qualitatively different nuclear weapons 
capability. Syria together with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
Saudi Arabia is counted among the states of the region which 
acquire unrestrained amounts of advanced weapons systems, 
and they are identified as perverting states of the regional 
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security. 4 Syria has lost its major ally the Soviet Union 
by the beginning of the 1990s. This made Syria remain 
lonely for some time since it could not received neither 
economic nor military aid from the state to which Syria has 
established its both standing in the Middle East, and its 
entire foreign policy 
now, Syria has to set 
which has changed to 
framework. Turkey perceives 
itself in the international 
great degree. The Syrian 
that, 
system 
foreign 
policy has been formulated focusing mainly on the state of 
Israel. Both states contest over the same territories on 
the Greater Israel and Greater Syria grounds. As Syria's 
foreign policy fixed upon mostly on Israel, it developed its 
military capabilities in the same line with Israel. 
Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and developing 
chemical and biological capabilities, responded by the 
development of the arsenals in part as a response. 5 Syria 
has been left isolated by other Middle Eastern states 
particularly due to its support for Iran. With its stance 
against Israel and sympathy for Iran, and its poor relations 
with Turkey- particularly due to the issue of Hatay, and 
certainly for the water dispute- left Syria isolated in the 
geographical region where it is located. 
The points raised above altogether demonstrate that, 
though Syria acquired weapons of mass destruction being 
against Israel, it can use them as an item leverage against 
Turkey. However, it is not plausible for a state to use 
such a significant leverage against a state to whom its 
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existence is dependent. Water is such an item that a state 
cannot risk its scarcity. 
Turkish perception of this situation of Syria is built 
upon the view that, Syria being almost an isolated state in 
the Middle East cannot continue its existence without water, 
and cannot survive without getting aid or at least a 
positive approach from either the US or the EU. With the 
lack of the Soviet economic aid, furthered with disputes 
with almost all of its neighbouring states, it has to find 
some moderate way to conduct its foreign relations. In 
fact, an improvement with the relations with the US was 
initiated before the Gulf War. This was a clear indication 
that a dramatic reversal of Syrian foreign policy was taking 
place. 6 However, Syria only thought that, it needed the 
backing of a superpower in a region like the Middle East, 
though not calculating the fact that its major and secondary 
opponents were also backed by the same superpower. Turkey 
being an ally of the US and having support from the EU makes 
it difficult for Syria to get support for its own claims. 
Hence, Turkish understanding of this situation is that, 
Syria should have to find a moderate way in resolving its 
disputes with all its neighbours and should have its place 
among the democratic states of the world in the early 2000s. 
On August 23, 1994, Syria participated on the foreign-
minister level in a summit conference with Iran and Turkey 
in which the Kurdish question figured prominently. At this 
summit the Syrian side declared that Syria was adamantly 
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opposed to the fragmentation of Middle East countries.' 
These declarations in fact mean very little as terrorist 
infiltrations still continue from Syria, and no severe step 
has been taken regarding this issue. 
Following the analysis on the Syrian continuation of 
following a non-cooperative foreign policy, it is useful to 
consider, what would be the foreign policy options of Syria 
and Turkey, 
vice-versa: 
agreed in 
shelter for 
if the foreign policy setting would be just the 
The case is, Turkey does not release the amount 
the 1987 Protocol, but Syria stops providing 
PKK terrorism in Turkey. This case from the 
Syrian point of view constitutes a major drawback for one of 
its most significant domestic issues. If Turkey does not 
commit to the terms of the Protocol, then Syria would be 
facing many problems due to the severe water shortages that 
are to emerge. The use of water in the country- a domestic 
issue- turns out to be an issue of foreign policy. In 
various studies it is stated that, 
backward techniques for irrigation. 
lead to the evaporation of water, 
Syria utilizes extremely 
These techniques both 
and its waste. These 
points are determined by various researchers as mentioned 
before. 8 Apart from these, water for daily use is also 
insufficient. An overall shortage of which primary reason 
can be indicated as the high birth rates almost threatens 
the survival of the state as a whole. Therefore, Syria is 
dependent on Turkey on this issue, but the Turkish failure 
to fulfill its duty is vital. However, if Turkey follows 
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such a foreign policy on this issue, then it becomes clear 
that, Turkey by taking into account the above mentioned 
capabilities of Syria calculates that, though being too 
promising, it is not plausible within the strategic 
environment to use the capabilities as a matter of threat, 
and the use of military power against Turkey is not 
promising at all. The primary reason for this stems from 
the fact that, even if Turkey does not release the amount 
stated, 
such a 
Syria cannot 
policy would 
opt for the mentioned alternative as 
leave Syria with floods and related 
disasters. From the Turkish perception, it may be argued 
that, Syria lacks hope for future change on the situation as 
it suffers at the most, if such a policy option is utilized. 
Formulating such a foreign policy, can furnish Turkey 
with two positive and two negative results. Turkey can be 
regarded as having an advantageous position over Syria on 
grounds that, Turkey acquires a position that it starved; 
it furnishes that, the support provided for PKK terrorism is 
terminated. Accordingly, Turkey becomes able to have a step 
towards the furnishing of stability in domestic politics. 
However, Turkey suffers from a decline in the international 
scene, likewise the Syrian position in the current 
situation. By not releasing more than 500m3 /sec of water, 
Turkey violates the rules put forward by the International 
Law. This defection in fact stems from two issues: First, 
T·urkey is bound to provide the downstream states with a 
certain amount of water, and also it has to fulfill its duty 
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emanating from the Protocol. The other international 
implication of this decline for Turkey is that, in the post-
Cold War era with the more powerful trends of cooperation 
and integration, it will certainly be faced with a decrease 
in its credibility in the international arena. Such a 
foreign policy option would deteriorate its standing as an 
ally of the US, and becoming a part of the arrangements in 
the EU, thus would be isolated in global interactions. 
Further, it will not be saving its face in the Syrian 
cooperation, but it will be suffering at the greatest extent 
from its own defection. 
Another policy option for this current situation is 
the case in which both parties to the conflict do not 
cooperate. In this case, Turkey, again does not provide 
Syria with the agreed amount of water, in response it is 
bound to resist the continued support for terrorism. Syria 
is affected by the decrease in the water received, but still 
continues to support terrorism in Turkey. This situation 
can be viewed as a case of balance of defection of both 
parties regarding the issue, 
over the other. Instead, 
and neither has an advantage 
they share a perfect non-
cooperative foreign policy environment, 
indicate that, neither is better off, 
which significantly 
but both are in a 
condition which none of them desires. This may mean that, 
the stalemate faced by both parties in this option, may be 
altered by the Syrian support for terrorism. Since both 
parties do not cooperate, they have a stalemate situation. 
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But it may be argued that, both Turkey and Syria may retain 
a hope to change the balance of stalemate, by using water 
and PKK card respectively. What this case entails is that, 
Syria though receives less than 500m3/sec of water is not in 
a situation as bad as the case when it hinders the support 
for PKK terrorism in Turkey, but . . again receives the same 
amount of water. Therefore, from the Turkish perspective, 
Syria is in a better situation in this option, since it can 
still continue to support a terrorist organization operating 
in Turkey while receiving less water than the agreed amount. 
One more foreign policy option for the case at hand, 
is that, both states cooperate to end the conflict. Turkey 
provides Syria with the agreed amount of water in the 
Protocol, and Syria ends the support provided for terrorism 
in Turkey. The implications of this option for Turkey are 
the realization of the end to which Turkey wants to achieve, 
and the furnishing of a contributing development for putting 
an end to the domestic instability. Another positive 
implication of this policy is that, Turkey increases its 
international credibility by complying with the terms of the 
Protocol, and accordingly respect to international law. A 
detailed account of this case can be given as such: 
The most important security concern for Turkey 
particularly starting with the second half of the 1980s and 
throughout the entire decade of the 1990s is the 
deterioration emanating from the separatist 
organizations that operate within the country. 
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terrorist 
It is not a 
secret that these terrorist organizations receive support 
from the neighbouring countries. However, when the case is 
to terminate the support for PKK from Syria is considered it 
is not possible for Turkey to sign an agreement with Syria 
for the "sharing" of the waters of the Euphrates. Turkey 
considers that, determination of a policy in a cooperative 
manner both abates the resolution of the conflict and will 
prepare a reasonable base for the conduct of future 
relations. When this option is examined for the Syrian 
side, it becomes clear that, according to Turkey, Syria gets 
the fair amount in ending this conflict. In this option, 
the Turkish commitment to the terms of the 1987 Protocol 
deems to be conclusive. 9 Turkish position on this option is 
mainly due to the consideration that releasing more than 
50Qm3/sec is a fair agreement. 10 Once more to highlight, is 
the Turkish commitment for the definitions of the 
international law, and thus, to regard the river as a 
transboundary one. The Turkish standing makes it impossible 
for any other alternatives to be formulated. Having itself 
guaranteed not to make any moves with the status-quo brought 
about by the international law, Turkish standing has 
centered around only one issue: Following a water policy in 
line with the terms of the 1987 Protocol. Turkey perceives 
that, the only viable reference for the issue is the 
agreement reached by signing this Protocol, which was 
primarily concluded on the principle of cooperation for many 
issues. 
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The implications of this option for Turkey are the 
realization of the end to which Turkey wants to achieve; the 
end of the domestic instability. Another positive 
implication of this policy is that, Turkey increases its 
international credibility by complying with the terms of the 
Protocol, and accordingly respect to international law. 
Turkish view also underlines that, if Syria stops 
in the supporting terrorism 
international arena 
in Turkey, then its 
will terminate, 
isolation 
accordingly, its 
international credibility will increase. 11 In relation with 
this Turkish perception of just the support for terrorism 
issue, Turkey also perceives another development as 
conclusive for its Syrian policy: Syria's continued 
negotiation with Israel likewise with the United States; 
the desire to be involved in the Middle East peace process 
and become a creditable actor in this process. Though Syria 
wants to see Turkey as much as vitiated due to both the 
water claims and the Hatay problem, it began to realize that 
neither Europe nor the US want the destabilization of Turkey 
by any means. It is again worth noting that Syria does not 
want to remain outside the emerging trends and formulations 
of the post-Cold War era. 
Another important point for the formulation of Turkish 
foreign policy regarding this issue is the Turkish 
perception that, Syria and Turkey have almost full 
information vis-a-vis each other and they have similar 
expectations in the resolution of this conflict when their 
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national security considerations 
Turkey perceives that they have 
sense that, both of these states' 
are calculated together. 
full information in the 
policy formulations are 
based on the knowledge that they share. Turkey perceives 
that, it has the knowledge regarding the water issue for 
Syria, i.e., Syria has serious problems regarding irrigation 
and use of the water, and needs not less than 500m3/sec of 
water to be released from the Euphrates. Turkey also 
assumes that, Syria supports terrorist activities in Turkey, 
and demands from the Syrian state to stop terrorist 
infiltrations into the Turkish territory. 
Therefore, Turkey perceives that these two states know 
each other's top national security priorities: According to 
Turkish view, for Syria it is the release of water not less 
than 500m3/sec of water from the Euphrates; and for Turkey, 
it is the prevention of the alleged support provided for 
terrorist activities emanating from Syria. Therefore, from 
the Turkish perspective, whether it is true or not, both 
states have acquainted each other with information regarding 
their positions and give messages in this line. Further, 
according to Turkish perspective this calculation show that 
they have similar expectations, as regards the security 
considerations, vis-a-vis the linkage established between 
the two issues. 
The meetings held between the top statesmen of Syria 
and Turkey are almost countless and are mostly occupied by 
the discussion of the water issue, and the alleged support 
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for terrorist activities in Turkey. The results arrived at 
are not much different to the Turkish policy makers: In all 
meetings Syria gives a guarantee that, it will not allow any 
separatist organizations on its territory, and promises to 
provide the security of Turkey. The number of security 
protocols have reached 25 .12 
The importance of this account stems from the Turkish 
perception that, both states share information on this 
issue, and the their expectations on providing security 
strengthens a drive for cooperation. 
Further, in Turkish foreign policy circles it can be 
argued that, 11 full information 11 would provide each state 
with assurance about the other's policy options. Therefore, 
Turkish perception of the issue, independent of that of 
Syrian, that since they share the information regarding the 
conflict, they both are aware what the plausible policy 
actions can be. Turkey perceives such a milieu that, no 
alternative decisions shall be taken on this issue, as the 
Turkish insistence on following the terms of the 1987 
Protocol, which it sees as a fair amount, and does not 
consider any other options for the resolution of the 
conflict as available. However, it should be noted that, 
this does not necessarily account for the Syrian side, but 
rather does so for the Turkish perception of what the Syrian 
assumptions can be on this issue. 
Turkey signed several security protocols with 
which document the issue of border security. 
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Syria 
The 
international system of the post-Cold War era offering great 
opportunities to first to face many of the problems which 
could not come to the fore during the strict Cold War years, 
and secondly to resolve them in such cooperative ways that 
are almost unavoidable. The last point is important in the 
sense that, there are no more alliances that certain states 
can resist for certain things with support received from one 
of the superpowers, and it is not ignorable that, the states 
in the world are getting in close contact with one another. 
Therefore, the Turkish perception of the issue is more 
centered around the view that, Turkey insists on not 
negotiating a water sharing agreement with Syria, on grounds 
that, it is committed to the rules of international law, and 
accordingly to the terms of the 1987 Protocol. It also is 
firm on the issue that, both parties to the conflict are 
well aware of their expectations sustained by the Turkish 
understanding that, Turkey and Syria have full information 
regarding their positions with respect to the conflict. 
Accordingly, Turkey insists that the only cooperative 
solution is the Turkish commitment to the terms of the 1987 
Protocol and the Syrian attempt to put an end to the shelter 
provided to terrorist activities in Turkey- which is not in 
fact a cooperative solution for the Syrian side. 
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6.2 Assurance Game 
Assurance game is a simple one-shot, two-by-two game 
with no dominant strategy . 13 The matrix of the assurance 
game is as follows:l4,1s 
Actor B 
3,1 2,2 
In this matrix, A and B are players; A1 , A2, B1 , B2 are 
alternative actions that can be made by players A and B. 
While A1 and B1 are strategies of Cooperation, A2 and B2 are 
that of Defection. The payoffs are reflected with numbers 
ranging from the least preferred to the most preferred: 1 to 
4. In order to make the explanation clearer, a simplistic 
evaluation of the results of this game matrix is: 
• (A1 ,B1 )= Cooperation (C) 
• (A2,B2)= Defection (D) 
The features of this game can be explained as such: 
In Assurance Game, A prefers A1 only if B chooses B1 , and B 
prefers B1 only if A chooses A1 . 
that emerges, A1B1 , leaves both 
The equilibrium16 outcome 
satisfied. There is, 
however, a second equilibrium outcome possible in this case, 
one that emerges from each actor's desire to maximize its 
minimum gain. Such a minimaxl7 rule would leave A to choose 
A2 and B to choose B2, the course of action that would ensure 
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that, at the very least, they avoid their '"10rst outcomes. 
Yet the A2B2 outcome, although an equilibrium one, is 
mutually undesirable: Only A1B1 , however, is a "coordination 
equilibrium. 1118 The other equilibrium outcome, A2 B2 , does 
not qualify as such because each actor can shift from it and 
make the other better off by doing so_ 1 9 Thus as long as 
each player is aware of the other's preferences, the two 
will converge on the A1B1 outcome that both most prefer. 
Elster considers this case as individually inaccessible2 C!, 
nonetheless, he expects convergence because the outcome is 
individually stable. Stein, on the other hand, as adopted 
in this study, considers this case to be individually 
accessible precisely because there are "convergent 
expectations. 1121 The "proffered information 1122 would provide 
each player with assurance about the other's preferences, as 
would be necessary for expectations to converge on the one 
of the two equilibria that all prefer. 
6.3 Using Assurance Game as a Model to Understand Turkish 
Perception of the Conflict Situation 
In this part of the study the issue-linkage between 
the water conflict and the support for PKK terrorism is 
examined within the framework of the Assurance Game, so as 
to see how Turkish perception of the conflict can be modeled 
within this framework, and how Turkey perceives the issue as 
an assurance game. The original matrix of the game as 
explained above is: 
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A 1 (C) 
Actor A 
A 2 (D) 
B 1 (C) 
4,4 
3,1 
Actor B 
B2 (D) 
1,3 
2,2 
And the use of this game as a model in understanding 
the Turkish perception of the conflict is: 
PKK 0 
Syria 
PKK 
>500m3/sec 
4,4 
3,1 
Turkey 
<500m3 /sec 
1,3 
2,2 
In Assurance Game cooperation for Turkey is providing 
Syria with the exact amount of water as agreed in the 1987 
Protocol; that is >500m3/sec=B1 , and for Syria- but this is, 
of course, what Turkey perceives as Syrian cooperation- it 
is to put an end to providing shelter to the PKK terrorists 
on its territory, so as to stop terrorist infiltration into 
Turkey: PKK0 =A1 (stopping the shelter provided to PKK 
activities). 
As for defection, it lS releasing less than 500m3/sec 
of water to Syria for Turkey; <500m3 /sec=B2, and it lS to 
continue to providing shelter to the PKK activities for 
Syria; 
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As 
following 
only the 
the main features of the 
the original matrix of the 
foreign policy alternatives 
game are explained 
game, at this stage 
available via the 
plausible outcomes are elaborated. 
In this part once again to repeat all the examinations 
should be regarded as they are the Turkish perception of the 
issue. 
First, the (4,4) coordination equilibrium outcome 
will be examined as to show how, from the Turkish perception 
of the situation, this outcome serves for both states ends 
and to demonstrate that coordination is largely significant 
for both parties. When this outcome is examined the 
following case is reached: This outcome demonstrates that 
two principle one being foreign and the other domestic 
policy objectives are satisfied. One of these is that, 
• Cooperation for Turkey is perceived to be the case 
of willing to fulfill its duty by releasing >500m3 /sec of 
water to Syria as guaranteed in the 1987 Protocol. Turkey 
by committing itself to this foreign policy decision, 
considers no other plausible policies. 
• The other principal objective for Turkey in making 
cooperation with Syria 
terminate a policy that 
degree of instability, 
is having the other party 
is leading to the increase of 
which in turn deteriorates 
to 
the 
the 
economic development in Turkey. What one implicative side 
of achieving this is to become able to furnish stability 
through the cessation of one source of support to such a 
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terrorist organization, thus the recovery of a type of 
development that shall contribute to the peaceful internal 
organization of the Turkish state. 
In this outcome, as a result of cooperation, by taking 
into account, their convergent expectations regarding the 
top national security issues, plus, proffered information, 
the following points are determined: 
For Syria, it; 
• receives the amount of water that is deemed to be 
fair by Turkey; 
• gains international credibility by the termination 
of support provided for terrorist activities in a foreign 
country; 
• prepares the ground for integration with the world, 
because, the above point guarantees that an end would be put 
for its isolation in the international arena. 
For Turkey, it; 
• likewise Syria would end up with the furnishing of 
its top national security concern. The Syrian support for 
terrorism in Turkey would be prevented, thus domestic 
stability can be provided; 
• continues to release the amount of water as agreed 
in the Protocol, by respecting international law, and its 
credibility in the international arena is preserved. 
The second outcome in the matrix is (2,2); the other 
equilibrium outcome, seems 
serve to Syrian ends at 
not 
all. 
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preferable 
In this 
as it does not 
outcome, Syria 
continues to support PKK terrorism in Turkey while being 
punished by Turkey in receiving less than 500m3/sec of 
water. Since the Turkish approach will be to release 
<500m3 /sec of water, which means the suffering of the Syrian 
state, it is not an acceptable outcome for both parties. 
Therefore, from the Turkish perspective and also from that 
of Syrian, it seems impossible for Syria to opt for this 
equilibrium outcome. 
• this outcome may mean that, both states are in an 
urge to change this equilibrium stalemate. 
The third outcome is (3,1): While Turkey cooperates, 
Syria defects, i.e., 
500m3/sec of water 
Turkey provides Syria with more than 
and Syria continues to support PKK 
terrorism in Turkey by providing shelter. According to 
Turkey, this reflects the current situation of the conflict: 
Turkey receives 1, which means that it gets the least value 
given outcome, and Syria gets 3, means that while continuing 
to deteriorate Turkey from the inside provides Syria with 
the enough water as agreed in the Protocol. 
The leading positions in this outcome can be 
summarized as such: 
For Turkey, it; 
• suffers from a major domestic instability due to the 
continuing Syrian support for terrorism, thus domestic 
credibility of its foreign policy towards Syria receives a 
blow. 
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For Syria, it; 
• seems furnished that, it has still the option to 
weaken Turkey from the inside; 
• continues to receive the amount of water guaranteed 
in the 1987 Protocol, though it defects; 
• faced with the decrease in its international 
credibility as it is enumerated among the states which 
support international terrorism; 
• ends up with international isolation in the face of 
the new cooperative trends of the post-Cold War era. 
The forth outcome obtained in the Assurance Game is 
(1,3), which corresponds to the case of Turkey's release of 
less than 500m3/sec of water in the face of Syrian 
cooperation. This case is impossible as Turkey is bound to 
release at least 500m3 /sec of water and as such a case is 
not plausible at all for both parties to the conflict. 
Syria shall not yield by not supporting terrorism in Turkey 
if Turkey were to cut off the amount agreed in the Protocol. 
In this outcome, 
• suffers from 
for Syria, it; 
many problems which are directly 
related to survival of the state of Syria as it is, due to 
the decrease in the amount of water; 
• knows that it is dependent on Turkey, therefore, the 
situation emerged in the face of its cooperation leads Syria 
to think that, it has no hope for future change of the 
situation; 
For Turkey, it; 
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• provides the desired situation, as regards 
terrorism, for furnishing domestic stability; 
• violates the international law, which results in the 
decrease of its credibility in the international arena. 
This reasoning can be viewed as the ultimate one in 
explaining the Turkish cooperation in the face of the 
Syrian. 
At the theoretical level, in the very nature of this 
game the parties to a conflict are deemed to have each other 
assured in attaining cooperation. It is not the goal to 
cheat over one another in this game. The (4,4) outcome as 
seen in the matrix is individually stable. Further, this 
outcome is individually accessible precisely, because there 
are convergent expectations. This calculation yet based on 
the principle of providing information, i.e., the "proffered 
information" would provide each actor with assurance about 
the other's preferences. However, this evaluation can only 
be credited from the Turkish perception of the issue on 
grounds that, Turkey perceives this outcome as cooperative, 
and thinks that Syria would also consider it as cooperation 
if Syria wants to resolve the conflict. In fact, this is 
not the case from the Syrian perception of the issue, as its 
one and only alternative policy is the signing of a sharing 
agreement with Turkey. So, it should be kept in mind that, 
all the arguments in study are from the perception of the 
Turkish state of the issue. 
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considerable problem in evaluating and in understanding the 
Syrian perception and policy regarding the issue: 
Cooperation for Turkey does not -and in fact- mean 
cooperation for Syria. On the contrary, a cooperative 
solution for Turkey is the source of the current conflict 
itself. However, what Turkey regards as the Syrian 
perception is in fact its own thinking as regards the Syrian 
perception. The principal argument put forward by the 
Syrian government is signing of a water sharing agreement 
with Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish state is faced with a 
paradox with respect to the resolution of the conflict. The 
paradox is the case of the resolution of the conflict from 
the Turkish perception is the primary source of the 
conflict. This makes the negotiation positions of the 
parties carried to a stalemate. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
The primary objective of this study was to describe 
the way Turkish foreign policy makers perceive foreign 
policy options as regards the water conflict between Syria 
and Turkey. A game theoretical model is used as a setting 
to understand the logic behind the Turkish interpretation of 
the current situation as regards the water conflict and 
related alleged Syrian support for PKK terrorism in Turkey. 
Another aim, by using the model, was to explain the 
constraints attached to the attainment of a cooperative 
solution to the conflict. 
The secondary goal of the study was to indicate the 
importance of a natural resource as a foreign policy i tern 
and to discuss the way states formulate their foreign 
policies by taking into account this new dimension. 
The study did not aim to elaborate on possible 
conflict resolution options and did not analyze the Syrian 
interpretation of the conflict situation. 
This study, in the basic terms, was an exercise of a 
foreign policy issue within the framework provided by game 
theory. 
In this study it is concluded that, from the Turkish 
perception of the issue, cooperation between the two states 
is the only acceptable outcome. The way Turkey perceives 
the issue and accordingly the matrix of the assurance game 
provided that convergent expectations are there, and 
cooperation is individually accessible exactly because there 
are these expectations. The study showed that, Turkey 
perceives that the proffered information provides each 
player with assurance about the other's preferences, as 
would be necessary for expectations to converge on the one 
of the two equilibria that all prefer. As indicated in the 
application chapter, the main thrust in applying assurance 
game to model the Turkish perception of the conflict stemmed 
from the above underlined features of this strategic 
interaction case. The proffered information regarding one 
another's preferences deems to be decisive in this exercise. 
This game is peculiar with its standing more inclination 
towards international cooperation, and the features of the 
game as stated above resulted in a cooperative manner just 
for one party though it is the source of the conflict for 
the other party; but this is due to the misperception of 
the situation by Turkey, and the paradox that it has faced. 
Turkey, in this study, firmly depended on two criteria 
in maintaining its position, which are mainly the source of 
the conflict and constitutes a limitation for the resolution 
or at least negotiation of the conflict: The first is the 
standing point for Turkey regarding the amount of water to 
be released from the Euphrates is international law. Turkey 
by defining the Euphrates as a transboundary river closes 
all the options for any discussion regarding sharing of the 
waters of the river or accepting any kinds of agreement 
related to this issue. The second criterion for Turkey is 
the Protocol signed in 1987. It does not see any failure 
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vis-A-vis its position as it fulfills its duty regarding the 
amount released to Syria. 
Therefore, the exercise in this study, has been set up 
on actual foreign policy determinants of one of the states 
and is carried out on grounds that, how this state perceives 
the conflict and what the other party perceives regarding 
the issue. Modelling such a situation by using game theory 
enabled the researcher to see the Turkish perception of the 
basic structure of the conflict and the simplification 
brought about by the theory as a framework for understanding 
the issue from one state's perception eased the 
understanding of the conflict in the clearest manner. 
Another significant point raised in this study is the 
way water turned out to be an asset that can be qualified as 
a matter of high politics, and an item in foreign policy 
making. It is pointed out that, with the inclusion of new 
items in defining security, water ranks among the top new 
issues that become a mediocre in international relations. 
This is the secondary objective of the study to argue the 
stance of a resource such as water in the new security 
framework of the post-Cold War environment, and foreign 
policy dimension of the issue. 
Following these general conclusions, more specific 
conclusions should also be addressed. 
Cooperation from the Syrian perception is Turkey's 
acceptance for the signing of water sharing agreement. 
However, as this can never be among the alternatives for the 
84 
Turkish foreign policy makers, a more accommodative solution 
can be the renewment of water releasing protocol. For 
example, a new protocol shall be prepared as a package, 
underlining the release of more water; certain conditions 
regarding the well-being of the downstream states; and 
combining this issue within a more security oriented 
framework so as to provide that, downstream states would not 
retain any inconveniences regarding the upstream. 
Therefore, three points as regards the actual conditions are 
determined: 
• Full cooperation for Syria is the signing of a water 
sharing agreement with Turkey. 
from the Turkish perspective. 
However, this is irrelevant 
• Cooperation for Turkey is to make it acceptable for 
Syria to return to the status-quo. However, this has been 
tried to be nullified by Syria, and perceived as the source 
of the conflict. This point is significant in understanding 
the dynamics of the Middle East region, and distinguishing 
the inconveniences of formulating foreign policy in this 
region. 
• The one and only plausible alternative solution to 
this conflict can be preparation of a more promising 
protocol to satisfy both parties to the conflict. 
85 
NOTES 
CHAPTER I 
:Robert Jervis, The I.ogi c of Images in Tnternat i ona l 
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, Morningside 
Edition, 1989), xix. 
2Jervis, 
Politics 
Perception ;rnn Mi spercept ion 1 n Int ernat i ona l 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
_::Jervis, The I.ogi c of Images, ibid. 
4Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations· 
Bargaining. Decision Making. and System StrJ1ctJ1re in 
International Crises, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1977). 
CHAPTER II 
1Elaborate studies are carried out for the conflict over the 
Jordan River, among them the significant ones are: J. 
Isaac and H. Shuval, eds., Water and Peace in the Middle 
East· Proceedings of the First Israeli-Palestinian 
Intern at ion a 1 Academic Conference on Water, Zurich, 10-13 
December 1992, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B. V. - Studies 
in Environmental Science- 1994); and papers presented in 
other conferences are elaborate studies on the Jordan river 
conflict. Apart from them, chapters related to Israeli 
water conflicts are particularly important studies in; 
Nurit Kliot, Water Resol!rces and Conflict in the Middle 
E.a.s.t.. (London: Routledge, 1994); and Daniel Hillel Rivers of 
Eden· The Struggle for Water and the Qllest for Peace in the 
Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 
2J. Kolars and W. A. Mitchell, The Ellphrates River and the 
Solltheast Anatolia Development Project (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), xxv. 
3Thomas Naff and Ruth t. Matson, eds., Water in the Middle 
East· Conflict or Cooperation, (Boulder: Westview Replica 
Edition, 1984) 
,;Kolars, "The Future of the Euphrates River, 11 submitted at 
the World Bank Conference titled International Workshop on 
Comprehensive Water Resources Management Policy, in 
Washington DC, 1991. 
:T. Allan, 11 Irrigated Agriculture in the Middle East: The 
Future," in Peter Beaumont and Keith McLachlan, eds., 
Agri cul tllra 1 Development in the Middle Ea st, (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons); "Water Resources in the Middle East: 
Economic and Strategic Issues," University of London, SOAS: 
Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East 
Water Database, 1988; "The Euphrates Water: Current and 
Future Water Sharing," University of London, SOAS: Center 
for Nera and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Water 
Database, 1993; "Fortunately There are Substitutes for 
86 
Water: Otherwise Our Hydropolitical Future Would be 
Impossible," University of London, SOAS: Center for Nera 
and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Water Database, 
1993; "Water in the Arab World: Overall Perspectives on 
Countries and Regions," University of London, SOAS: Center 
for Nera and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Water 
Database, 1994. 
(Allan, and C. Mallat, eds., Water in the Middle East· 
T.egal, Political and Commerr.i;:il Implications, (London: 
Tauris Academic Studies, 1995) 
7Peter Beaumont, Gerald Blake, and Malcolm Wagstaff, eds., 
The Mjddle East· A Geographical Study, (New York: Halsted 
Press, 1988) 
t<peter H. Gleick, Water j n Crisis: A Gui de to World's Fresh 
Water Resources (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
9N. Beschorner, "Water and Instability in the Middle East, " 
Adelphi Paper, 273, (IISS, London: Brassey's, 1992) 
'- 8Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll, US Foreign Pol icy on Wat er 
Resrnirces in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 1987) ; Starr and 
Stoll, eds., The Politics of Scarcity· Water in the Middle 
Ea.s.t.., (Boulder: Westview, 1988) 
l'-John Waterbury, 
Utilization of 
Conference: The 
Progress, and 
1990. 
"Dynamics of Basin-Wide Cooperation in the 
the Euphrates," paper prepared for the 
Economic Development of Syria; Problems, 
Prospects held at Damascus, January 6-7, 
1- 2David LeMarquand, "Politics 
Cooperation and Management," 
Teclaff, eds., Water in a 
Westview Press, 1977) 
of International River Basin 
in Albert E. Utton and Ludwik 
Developing World, (Boulder: 
13bzden Bilen, "Prospects for Technical Cooperation in the 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin," in Asit Biswas, ed., The Water of 
the Middle East, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
95-116. 
=-~cengiz Okman, "Su Sorunu ve Ortadogu 'da Stratej ik Durum," 
in Sabahattin $en, ed., Su Son mu. TDrki ye ve Ortadogu, 
(Baglam Yay1nc1l1k: 1993), 414. 
:.~Peter Rogers, "'The 
International River 
Forum 17, 2 (1993). 
Value 
Basin 
of Cooperation in Resolving 
Disputes , " ...,N ..... a..... t... 1 .... ir ....a~l_ ...... R~e-s ........ o""u .... r_,.c....,e_s..._ 
Hserdar GO.ner, "Turkish-Syrian War of Attrition: T·he Water 
Dispute," unpublished paper. 
l 7Ay::;;eg0.l Kibaroglu, "Prospects for Cooperation in the 
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin," Working Paper no 42 of 
Amsterdam International Studies, February 1996. 
87 
~ 'Kaynak Acar, 
(1995). 
"Stratejik A91dan Su Sorunu," Strateji 3 
CHAPTER III 
: Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic 
Mindless Eclecticism or Creative 
Clarke, ed. , New Perspectives 
Brassey's, 1993), 127 
Studies Perspectives: 
Synthesis?" in Michael 
on Security, (London: 
"Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources 
of International Politics," International Organization 49 
(Autumn 1995), 770. 
'Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "The Environmental and 
International Security," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. 
Thomas, eds., World Security· Challenges for a New Century, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 274. 
~Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Toward a Politics of the 
Planet Earth (New York: Van Nostand Reinhold Company, 1971) 
'David B. Dewitt, "Introduction: The New Global Order and 
the Challenges of International Security" in David Dewitt, 
David Haglung, and John Kirton, eds., Building a New Global 
Order· Emerging Trends in International Sec1irity, (Ontario: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 9. See also Thomas Homer-
Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes 
of Acute Conflict," International Security 16, 2 (Fall 
1991) t 76-116 • 
'A renewable resource has both a stock and a flow. A stock 
is the quantity or quality of the resource that is 
available for consumption or that maintains a useful 
service; and a flow is the incremental addition to, or 
restoration of, the stock per unit of time. See David 
Pearce and Kerry Turner, Economics of Nat11ral Resources and 
the Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1990), 52-53; and David Wirth, "Climate Chaos," Foreign 
Policy 74 (Spring 1989), 10; World Resources· 1992-1993 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and World 
Resources· 1990-1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990); The State of the World 1989-1995 (New York: Norton, 
1989-1995) 
··Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup 
Conflict," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, World 
Security· Cha 11 enges for a New Century (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1994), 294; and Peter Gleick, "The 
Implications of Global Climatic Changes for International 
Security," Climatic Change 15-1,2 (October 1989), 309-325. 
'Although this is not the point to be discussed in this 
study, oil was regarded as the real motive, being a natural 
88 
resource, behind the 1991 Gulf War can be given as the 
recent example for a war fought for the mentioned reason. 
'Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations 1n Conflict (San 
Francisco: Freeman, 1975) 
·_,;Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politi cs· 'T'he Meno 
for Choice (New York: W. W. Freeman and Company, 1989), 
186. 
::For a discussio.n of What ~.ras Cold War? to see how different 
scholars have defined the Cold War itself see Pierre Allan, 
"The End of the Cold War: The End of International 
Relations Theory?, " in The End of rhe C'.o 1 d Wrir · Eva l llat i ng 
Theories of International Relations, Pierre Allan and Kjell 
Goldmann, eds., (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1992) I 228-229 • 
=- 2Russet and Starr, 186. 
:.:Paul A. Anderson, "What Do Decision Makers Do When They 
Make a Foreign Policy Decision?" in Charles F. Hermann, 
Charles W. Kegley, and James N. Rosenau, eds., NeJ& 
Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, (Boston: Allan 
and Unwin, 1987), 290. 
:;;see James Rosenau, 
Recurrent Questions 
Policy, " in Hermann, 
"Introduction: New Directions and 
in the Comparative Study of Foreign 
Kegley, and Rosenau. 1. 
:::Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, Int ernat i ona 1 Politi cs· A Framework 
for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 
the quote is from p.119, citing the words of Richard 
Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Spain, "Decision-Making as 
an Approach to International Politics, " in Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making, Snyder, Bruck and Spain (New York: Free 
Press, 1962), 82. 
:::Holsti, 118-13 9. 
=- 1Holsti, 93. 
=- 8International rivers are defined as drainage basins shared 
by two or more states or constitute the boundary between 
them. The definition is taken from; Julio Barberis, 
"International Rivers," in R. Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia 
of Publ i c Int ernat i ona 1 I.aw, 9 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 
1986) I 193-216. 
CHAPTER IV 
:L. Carl Brown, Tnternati anal Poli ti cs and the Middle East: 
Old Rules Dangerolls Game (London: I. B. Tauris, 1984), 3. 
2M. E. Yapp, The Near F.a st" Si nee the First World War, Vol. 
II (London: Longman, 1991), 4. 
89 
~Fawaz A. Gerges, The S11perpowers and the Mi dd 1 e East : 
Regional and International Politics 1955-1967 (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), 2. 
4Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, Tllrkey' s Security Policies 
Papers 164 (1981), 11. 
Adelphi 
'Holsti, Int ernat i ona l Politi cs, 9 6-101. Holsti states that 
unwillingness to commit military capabilities to others' 
purposes is the hallmark of non alignment as a foreign 
policy strategy. 
1'6mer Kllrk91loglu, Tiirkiye' n in Arap Ortadog11su 1 na Kan;n 
Politikas1 (1945-1970) (Ankara: Sevin<;: Matbaasi, 1972), 6. 
70ral Sander, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity 
and Change," in Ahmet Evin, ed., Modern Turkey· 
Continuity and Change, (Opladen: Leske Verlag and Budrich 
GmbH, 1984), 115-130. 
ssezer, 12. 
9Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Security Policy: 
Continuity and Change," in Douglas T. Stuart, ed., Politics 
and Security in the Sonthern Region of the Atlantic 
Alliance, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), 158. 
iosander, 116-118. 
EFerenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bospborus · The Foreign 
Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1971), 31-33. 
l2Holsti, International Politics, 101. 
l:.George S. Harris, Traub] ed Al 1 i ance · Turkj sh-American 
Problems in Historical Perspective· 1945-1971 (Washington, 
DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), 17-29. 
11.Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic 
and External Contexts," in John Chipman, ed., NATO and Its 
Southern Allies· Domestic and External Challenges, (New 
York: Routledge, 1988), 295-300. 
:..:sezer, "Prospects for a Southern European Security: A 
Turkish Perspective," in Roberto Aliboni, ed., Southern 
European Security 1 n rhP 1990s, (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1992), 117-120. 
'-EAptlllahat Ak:;;in, Atat1"jrk 'iin D1 $ Polit: i ka tl kel eri ve 
Di pl omasi si (Istanbul: inkilap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1966), 
97, and Batu, 3, cited in Aykan, 25. 
: 7 rn an attempt to probe the determinants of foreign policy 
making and the forces that direct the foreign policy 
outputs of Turkey at that period it is unavoidable to focus 
on the national role of Turkey on the international scene. 
National roles reflect the general and specific objectives 
governments pursue within regions or in the world as a 
90 
whole. Holsti, Tnt.ern;:it: i nn;:i l Politi cs, 115-116. Holsti in 
his classification determines 3 roles perceived by Turkey, 
namely, active-independent, regional-subsystem 
collaborator and faithful ally. Holsti, "National Role 
Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, " in Stephen 
Walker, ed., Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 16-17; 21-25. 
Because national role conceptions are closely related to 
orientations a profile of one of the role types that are 
highlighted by Holsti has to be given, which is "faithful 
ally." A faithful ally role conception is defined by 
Holsti as the "one in which the policy makers declare that 
they will support, with all means possible, their fraternal 
allies." It is the role played by a state which fulfills 
its alliance commitments made through mutual assistance and 
other types of treaties. Holsti, Internat i ona 1 Pol it i cs, 
113, see also Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the 
Study of Foreign Policy," Internat:ional Studies Quarterly, 
14 (1970), 233-309. 
:sBatu, 21-5, cited in Aykan. 
~?Aykan, ibid. 
2cKurkc;:uoglu, 183-187. 
2:sezer, "Turkey's Security," 30. 
22Karaosmanoglu, "Savunma Politikamizi :tncelemek," in 
Tiirkiye'nin Sav1mmasi (Ankara: Tisa Matbaacilik Sanayi, 
1987). 
2: Ero 1 Manis al i , ed . , ~T~i~ir~k~e7y~=~~A~n~A~c~t~i~'~re--P~a_r_t~n~e~r~-j~n~W~1~e~s~t_e~r~n~-
Mi d d le Rast:ern Rconnmic Relations- Seminar Papers, 
(Istanbul: ?, 1985). 
24James Wyllie, "Turkey- Renationalizing Foreign Policy," 
Jane's Intelligence Review, 7, 2 (1994), 74-75. 
2:Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Defense Policy: Problems and 
Prospects," in Jeffrey Simon, ed., European Security Policy 
After the Revolutions of 1989, (Washington: The National 
Defense University Press,· 1991), 544. 
2::Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, Realist 
Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria," in Bahgat Korany 
and A. E. Hillal Dessouki, eds., The Foreign Policy of Arab 
States· The Challenge of Change, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991) / 374. 
27Historically, the name Syria, which is in fact a name given 
to the region by the Europeans, refers to a region far 
larger than the one presently contained by the state called 
Syria. Historic Syria comprises all of four states- Syria, 
Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon- as well as the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip, and substantial portions of southeastern 
Turkey. A detailed account of the use of term is given in 
91 
Greater Syria. Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria· The History of 
an Ambition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 13-
16. 
7.8A. L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria (London: Macmillan, 
1969); Z. N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence 
(Beirut: Khayats, 1960) in Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, 
Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria." 
2~Hinnebusch, 375. 
>JHolsti, "National Role, " 16-17. 
:-.::_Margaret G. Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad, " in Barbara 
Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., Leadership And 
Negotiation in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger, 1991), 
70-95. 
-' 2Karim Pakradouni, "Hafez al-Assad-The Arabs' Bismarck," 
Manchester Guardian Weekly 129 (December 11, 1983), 14, in 
Hermann, "Syria's Al-Assad," 78. 
:,.::Robert G. Neumann, "Assad and the Future of the Middle 
East," Foreign Affairs 62 (Winter 1983/1984), 256. 
34Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria 1mder Assad 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 5. 
i.5Kurkc;uoglu, 16-18. 
CHAPTER V 
:For discussion of the principal points in the on-going 
debate, see Peter H. Gleick, "Environment, Resources, and 
International Security and Politics," in Eric Arnett, ed., 
Science and Tnternat i ona l Security· Respondj ng to a 
Changing World (Washington, D.C.: American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, 1990), 501-523; Gleick, "Water 
and Conflict: Fresh Water Resource and International 
Security," International Security 18, 1 (Summer 1993), 79-
112; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security, " 
Foreign Affairs 68,·2 (Spring, 1989), 162-177; Richard H. 
Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8, l, 
(Summer 1983), 129-153. 
2GAP means in Turkish "Southeastern Anatolia Project, " the 
abbreviation of Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi. The GAP 
consists of ·22 darns- 19 of which hydroelectric power plants 
(HPP)- and the $anl1urfa irrigation tunnels on the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers. GAP has 13 sub-projects, 7 of 
them for the Euphrates and 6 for the Tigris. It is 
estimated that 1-1. 6 million hectares would be irrigated 
when the entire project is completed. The biggest part 
within the GAP is the Ataturk Darn and the HPP and $anl1urfa 
irrigation tunnels. As the ninth largest dam in the world, 
the Ataturk HPP has a production capacity of 8. 9 billion 
92 
kwh per year. The $anliurfa tunnels will transport the 
water accumulated in the Ataturk Dam to the city of 
$anliurfa and to the Harran, Ceylanpinar, Siverek, Hilvan, 
and Bozova irrigation systems. It consists of two parallel 
26.4 km long, 8 meter diameter tunnels with an average flow 
rate of 328m3 /sec. It is also estimated that when the GAP 
completed, irrigation production will be possible on 53% of 
the entire arable fields of the Southeast region, compared 
\·Tith the 3% before the project was launched in the early 
1960s. Also, it is planned that 27 billion kwh of electric 
energy on an annual basis- 22% of Turkey's energy 
potential- will be generated by the HPPs within the 
project. Another estimation regarding employment is that 
when the project is completed, GAP is expected to provide 
jobs for three million people in the region. The 
information presented here to address the huge scale of the 
project is compiled from various parts of study prepared on 
the GAP per se. Ali ihsan Bagi$, GAP· The Cradle of 
Civilization Regenerated (Ankara: Interbank, 1989) 
:·see John Kolars, "The Hydro Imperative of Turkey's Search 
for Energy," The Middle East Journal 40, 1(Winter1986). 
4The artificial Ataturk Dam Lake formed behind the 83 
million cubic meters of the dam's main body is 817 km2 - now 
ranks the third largest lake in Turkey. 
5Turkish Daily News December 11 and 23, 1989. 
GFor example, Three Staged Plan for Optimum, Equitable and 
Reasonable Utilization of the Transboundary Watercourses of 
the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. It has been a valuable Plan 
using the language accepted by International Law. The 
concepts adopted in the Plan are incorformi ty with the 
International Law and the technical principles. What the 
major contribution of the Plan would be to save substantial 
amount of water and consequently result in sufficiency of 
water to meet the requirements of the three countries. The 
Plan proposed "Inventory studies for water resources," 
which will cover; the exchange of the whole available data; 
to check that data; to measure jointly the discharges; to 
evaluate and correct measurement; to exchange and check 
data about the quality of water; and further similar 
arrangements were offered for land resources, i.e., the 
same procedures were to be actualized for soil. The third 
stage would cover the evaluation of the data obtained from 
the above two sections. The details are derived from the 
original text of the Three Staged Plan obtained from the 
General Directorate of State Water Works. 
7Chapter 6: "Procedures for the Prevention and Settlement of 
Disputes," Article XXIX-1 of Helsinki Rules on the Uses of 
the Waters of International Waters. 
8 Ibid., Article XXX. 
93 
;'In international law a transboundary river is defined as a 
body of watercourse which crosses the cormnon political 
border between two or more countries. For a discussion of 
this issue see Hasret <:;omak, "International Law Issues: 
Euphrates-Tigris Watercourse System," Foreign Policy 5, 3-4 
( 1990) t 85-86 • 
:_:;Sandra Postel, Last Oasis· Facing Water Scarcity (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company), 87-88. 
CHAPTER VI 
:_T11rkish Daily News January 15, 1990. 
2News are continual regarding this issue, and the Turkisn 
claims are not baseless, in fact, when they are evaluated 
together. More than this, when top statesmen of Turkey and 
Syria the preservation of security ranks at the top of the 
issues discussed, and the Syrian officials cannot deny that 
they do not allow terrorist infiltrations from their 
territory. "Suriye ve ter6r," Milliyet, 30 Ekim 1993, 15; 
"$am'dan Apo'yu istedik," Milliyet, 21 Kas1m 1993, 12; 
"Suriye cephesinde yeni bir:;;ey yok, " Mi 11 i yet, 4 Aral1k 
1993, 21; "Apo art1k Suriye'ye giremeyecek," Hi1rriyet, 7 
Aral1k 1993, 29; "Esad'a ter6r k1skac1," Mi 11 iyet, 16 Ocak 
1994, 16. 
_:Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, 
Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation," Comparative Strategy 14 
(1995) t 164 • 
'Gerald M. Steinberg, 
Security," Survival 
"Middle East Arms Control and Regional 
36 (Spring, 1994), 139. 
0 Andrew Rathmell, "Syria's Insecurity," Jane's Intelligence 
Review 6 (September, 1994), 419. 
' 
r'Hani A. Faris, "The Arab Political Order After the Gulf 
War, " in Ibrahim Ibrahim, ed., The G11 l f Crisis· Backgro11nd 
and Consequences (Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab 
Studies, 1992), 224-226. 
:Harriyet, August 23, 1994. 
'Naff and Matson, 1984; Stoll and Starr, 1987; Kolars and 
Mitchell, 1991; Allan, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995. 
9The 1987 Protocol is done and signed by Prime Ministers 
Ozal and El-Kassem in Damascus on July 17, 1987, in t\\'O 
original copies in English. The title of the Protocol is: 
Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperatio~ 
Between the Republic of Turkey and the Syrian Arab 
Republic. The Protocol covers the following subjects: 
Petroleum and Gas; Water; Electricity; Trade; Banking 
Cooperation; Transport and Telecormnunication; 
Telecormnunication Field; and Cattle Transit Transportation. 
94 
The section dealing with the Water issue is as follows: 
"During the filling up period of the Ataturk Dam reservoir 
and until the final allocation of the waters of the 
Euphrates among the three riparian countries, the Turkish 
Side undertakes to release a yearly average of more than 
500m3 /sec at the Turkish-Syrian border and in cases where 
the monthly flow falls below the level of 500m3 /sec, the 
Turkish Side agrees to make up the difference during the 
following month. The two sides agreed to expedite the work 
of the Joint Technical Committee on regional waters." There 
are six more subsidiary articles in the water section of 
the Protocol which show that, the two parties are in 
principle agreed to cooperate. The underlining articles for 
the Turkish insistence on the current policy stems from the 
two mentioned articles. 
- In fact, Turkey agreed to undertake to release a yearly 
average of more than 500m3/sec at the Turkish-Syrian border 
and in cases where the monthly flow falls below the level 
of 500m3/sec, the Turkish side agreed to make up the 
difference during the following month. This point is 
clarified in the Article 6 of the Protocol. 
::In fact, Turkey implied a couple of times that it would use 
water as a leverage, however, never attempted to do so. The 
serious imply was made by the Prime Minister of the time 
~ill er in 1993, by saying that, " ... we shall not use water 
as a weapon. However, we do not make water a bargaining 
tool as well. We continue to release water, as long as our 
relationships are favorable with our neighbours. " "Su kozu 
ger9ekle~iyor. 11 HOrriyet, 14 Kasim 1993, 25. 
-LHowever, the promises given by the Syrian state are only 
valid for a very short period of time, as the infiltrations 
continue following a short period of time the meeting of 
the time. "Turkey, Iran and Syria Block Kurdish 
Aspirations," Turkish Probe, 17 November 1992; "Ankara 
Summit Aftermath," "Making Turkey an Economic Base," 
Turkish Probe, 24 November 1992; "Security Still a Main 
Problem on Ankara's Agenda," ~1rkish Probe, 5 January 1993; 
"Syria: Diplomacy over Troubled Waters," Tllrki sh Probe, 19 
January 1993; "Terror: No Longer a Commodity in Syrian 
Hands," "New Inroads with Syria," Turkish Probe, 26 
January, 1993; "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict," Jane's 
Intelligence Review, 7, 4, 172-174; "An Independent Kurdish 
State or the Stability of the Middle East," Turkish Probe, 
6 July 1993; "Turkey Caught in the Devil's Triangle," 
Turkish Probe, August 3, 1993. 
~-"A strategy is dominant if it is a best strategy (i.e., it 
maximizes a player's pay-off) regardless of the 
opposition's choice of strategy; see, Shaun P. Hargreaves 
Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory· A Critical 
Introduction (London: Routledge, 1995), 44. 
95 
>;Arthur A. Stein, Why Nati ans Cooperate: Circumstance and 
Choi~e in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 30-31. 
EThe features of the Assurance Game itself and its 
comparison with the Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken, and 
Deadlock games are examined in detail in George Tsebelis, 
Nested Games· Rational Choice in Comparative Politics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 61, 63, 
65-67, 71, 72, 78, 87, 89-90, 91, 240. 
JAn outcome is an equilibrium if it is brought about by 
strategies that agents have good reason to follow; see Heap 
and Varoufakis, 43. 
17 In game theory a minimax value is attached to an outcome if 
a minimum gain is obtained at the maximum value; see Stein, 
31. 
>A "coordination equilibrium" is defined by David K. Lewis 
as an outcome from which neither actor can shift and make 
anyone better off; see Convention· A Phi 1 osoph i ca J Study 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 14. 
i?For Lewis, this does not pose a coordination problem, which 
requires the existence of two or more coordination 
equilibria; see Convention, 24. 
2'Cin Stein footnote 11. Jon Elster, Ulysses and Sirens: 
~t:11nies in Rationality ann Irrationality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 21. 
2:The existence of convergent expectations is the 
characteristic of this game, and means that, both players 
have such expectations in the issue in consideration that, 
at some point and for the final attainment of the goal 
their expectations are at least theoretically converge or 
almost intersecting; Stein, 32. 
22proffered information is again specific for the assurance 
game, meaning that, both player in a strategic setting are 
well aware of their positions and retain the knowledge 
regarding what plausible actions can be taken by the 
opposite party. In sum, both players are informed by the 
opponent that, s/he would act in a certain way, and both 
know that what the limits of action are regarding to a 
certain issue- both players have full information regarding 
the opponent; see ibid. 
96 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
"An Independent Kurdish State or the Stability of the Middle 
East," D1rkish Probe, 6 July 1993. 
"Ankara Summit Aftermath," Turkish Probe, 24 November 1992. 
"Ankara'da $am gerginligi," Milliyet, 6 Kasim 1993, 11. 
"El-Rifai, samimi bir diplomat," Milliyet, 6 Kasim 1993, 15. 
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of Internati anal 
Waters. Chapter 6: "Procedures for the Prevention and 
Settlement of Disputes," Article XXIX-1. 
HOrriyet. August 23, 1994. 
"Making Turkey an Economic Base," Turkish Probe, 24 November 
1992. 
"Milletlerarasi Andla~ma," T C Resm] Gazete. 10 Aralik 
1987. No: 19660. (Protocol on Matters Pertaining to 
Economic -Cooperation Between the Republic of Turkey 
and the Syrian Arab Republic.) 
"New Inroads with Syria," Turkish Probe, 26 January, 1993. 
"Security Still a Main Problem on Ankara's Agenda," Turkish 
Probe, 5 January 1993. 
"Su kozu gercekle~iyor." HQrriyet, 14 Kasim 1993, 25. 
"Syria: Diplomacy Over Troubled Waters." Turkish Probe, 
January 19, 1993, 5. 
"Terror: No Longer a Commodity in Syrian Hands," Turkish 
Probe, 26 January, 1993 
The State of the World 1989-1995. New York: Norton, 1989-
1995. 
"The Three Staged Plan" prepared by the General Directorate 
of State Water Works. 
"Turkey, Iran and Syria Block Kurdish Aspirations, " Tiirki sh 
Probe, 17 November 1992. 
"Turkey Caught in the Devil's Triangle," Turkish Probe, 
August 3, 1993. 
"Turkey's Kurdish Conflict," Jane's Intelligence Review, 7, 
4 (1995)' 172-174 
Turkish Daj]y News December 11 and 23, 1989. 
Turkish Daily News, January 15, 1990. 
Wor:ld Resollr:ces: J 990-199]. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990. 
Wor:Jd Reso11r:ces · J 992-1993. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992. 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Ak9in, Aptulahat. Atatiir:k' iln D1 $ Po] it i ka jJ ke] er:i ve 
Diplomasjsi. Istanbul: Inkilap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 
1966. In Aykan, Mahmut B. "TU.rkiye'nin Basra Korfezi 
Guvenligi Politikasi: 1979-1988." ODTO GeJi9im 
Der:gisi. 21 (1994). 
Allan, Tony. "Irrigated Agriculture in the Middle East: The 
Future. " In Agr:i cu] tur:a] Development in the Middle 
Ea..s..t.., eds. Peter Beaumont and Keith McLachlan, New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1992. 
----- "The Euphrates Water: Current and Future Water 
Sharing." University of London, SOAS: Center for Nera 
and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Water 
Database, 1993. 
----- "Fortunately There are Substitutes 
Otherwise Our Hydropolitical Future 
Impossible." University of London, SOAS: 
for Water: 
Nera and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle 
Database, 1993. 
Would be 
Center for 
East Water 
----- "Water in the Arab World: Overall Perspectives on 
Countries and Regions," University of London, SOAS: 
Center for Nera and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle 
East Water Database, 1994. 
-----. "The Future of the Euphrates River," submitted at the 
World Bank Conference titled International Workshop on 
Comprehensive Water Resources Management Policy, in 
Washington DC, 1991. 
"Water Resources in the Middle East: 
Strategic Issues." University of London, 
for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, 
Water Database, 1988. 
Economic and 
SOAS: Center 
Middle East 
Allan, Pierre. "The End of the Cold War: The End of 
International Relations Theory?" In The End of the 
Cold War· Eva 111at i ng Theorj es of Intern at i ona 1 
Relations, eds. Pierre Allan and Kjell Goldmann, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992. 
Anderson, Paul A. "What Do Decision Makers Do When They Make 
a Foreign Policy Decision?" In New Directions in the 
Study of Foreign Policy, eds. Charles F. Hermann, 
Charles W. Kegley, and James N. Rosenau, Boston: 
Allan and Unwin, 1987. 
Bag19, Ali ihsan. GAP· The Cradle of 
Regenerated. Ankara: Interbank, 1989. 
Ci vi 1 i z at i on 
-----. Water as an Element of Cooperation and Development 10 
the Middle East. Istanbul: Ayna Yay1nlar1, 1994. 
Barberis, Julio. "International Rivers." In Encyclopedia of 
P11bl i c Tnternat i ona J I.aw, 9, ed. R. Bernhardt. 
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986. 
Batu, Hamit. "Turkiye' nin D19 Politikas1." T c DJ 9i 91 erj 
Bakanl 1 g1 Bell eteni. 6 (1965). In Aykan, Mahmut B. 
"Turkiye'nin Basra K6rfezi Guvenligi Politikas1: 
1979-1988." ODTO Geli9im Dergisi. 21 (1994). 
Beaumont, Peter; Blake, Gerald; and Wagstaff, Malcolm, 
The Middle East· A Geographical Study. New 
Halsted Press, 1988. 
eds. 
York: 
Beschorner, Natasha. "Water and Instability in the Middle 
East." Adelphi Paper. 273 (1992). 
Bilen, 6zden. "Prospects for Technical Cooperation in the 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin." In The Water of t:hE> Middle 
E.a..s..t., ed. Asit Biswas, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
Boulding, Elise. "The Commission Document on Peace Building 
in the Middle East." In Building Peace in the Middle 
East· Challenges for States and Civil Society. ed. 
Elise Boulding, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1994. 
B6lukba91, Suha. "Turkey Challenges Iraq and Syria: The 
Euphrates Dispute . " '"'Jci..o.l.l.1.._1 r.._nu.ga_.J __,o...u..f__..S"""o.LJ1u..1 t.i.....uh'--'A""'s"'-'-i ~a.i..nl.....__..ca<:;LJ..Jn.i....d.__..M""'-1..i ..1..dL.1.d.L.JJ~e 
Eastern Studies. 15:4 (Summer 1993). 
Brown, L. Carl. International Politics and the Middle East· 
Old Rules Dangerous Game. London: I. B. Tauris, 1984. 
Caponera, Dante A. "Legal and Institutional Concepts of 
Cooperation." paper presented at the International 
Conference on Transboundary Waters in the Middle East· 
Prospects for Regional Cooperation, Bilkent 
University, September 2-3, 1991. 
Choucri, Nazli, and North, Robert. Nations in Conflict. San 
Francisco: Freeman, 1975. 
c;omak, Hasret. "International Law Issues: Euphrates-Tigris 
Watercourse System." Foreign Policy. 5:3-4 (1990). 
Dewitt, David B. "Introduction: The New Global Order and the 
Challenges of International Security. 11 In Building a 
New ~Johal Order· Emerging Trends in International 
Security, eds. David Dewitt; David Hag lung; and John 
Kirton, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Elster, Jon. Ulysses and Si n~ns: Studies in Rat j ona 1 j ty and 
Irrationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979. 
Faris, Hani A. "The Arab Political Order After the Gulf 
War. " In The Gulf Crisis· Background and 
Consequences. ed. Ibrahim Ibrahim, Washington: Center 
for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1992. 
Freedman, Lawrence. "Strategic Studies Per spec ti ves: 
Mindless Eclecticism or Creative Synthesis?" In Na& 
Perspectives on Security, ed. Michael Clarke, London: 
Brassey's, 1993. 
Gerge s , F awaz A . .....T ..... h ...,.e _ ___._.S'"'"11'"l!!p.,_,e_r.._p~o'-"w...,e_r..__._.s_ ... a .... n~d~~t~h~e-~M~i~d .... d~l ... e~_R..........,a._.s,__.t~· 
Regional and International Politics. 1955-1967. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. 
G 1 e i ck , Pet er H . .l.JW .... a.._.t....,e ........ r_1.._· n.....__,,C_r ........ i .... sui ..... s........_· __.._A..__ ..... Gu.u .... i...,d""e...__.t__,o'"'--_.W...,o .......... r_.l ..... d ._'__,s...__ ..... F_r..._e,._,_.su...i.h 
Water Resources. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 
----- "The Implications of Global Climatic Changes for 
International Security." Climatic Change. 15:1,2 
(October 1989). 
-- ---
11 Environment, Resources, and International Security 
and Politics" In Science and International Secllrity· 
Responding to a Changing World. ed. Eric Arnett, 
Washington, D.C.: American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, 1990. 
"Water and 
International 
(Summer 1993). 
Conflict: 
Security." 
Fresh Water 
International 
Resource 
Sec!lri ty. 
and 
18:1 
GQner, Serdar. "Turkish-Syrian War of Attrition: The Water 
Dispute." Article. 
Harris, George S. Traub] ed Alliance: Turkish-American 
Prob] ems in Historical Perspective· J 945-J 971 . 
Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972. 
Harsanyi, Paul. "Game Theory and the Analysis of 
Int erna ti ona l Conflict . " ~A~11~s~t_r_a~l_i~a_n~-~·~I~o~u~r .... n.....,a ......... l __ ....,o,_....._f 
Politics and History. 11 (December 1965). 
Heap, Shaun 
Theory· 
1995. 
P. Hargreaves and Varoufakis, Yanis. .Ga.rn.e. 
A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge, 
Hermann, Margaret G. "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad." In Leadership 
and Negotiation in the Middle East. eds. Barbara 
Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, New York: Praeger, 
1991. 
Hillel, Daniel. Rivers of Eden· The Struggle for 
the Quest for Pear.e in the Middle East. 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Water and 
New York: 
Holsti, Kalevi Jaakko. International Politics· A Framework 
for Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1988. 
"National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign 
Policy, . " In Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. 
ed., Stephen Walker, Durham: Duke University Press, 
1987. 
----- "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign 
Policy." International Studies Quarterly. 14 (1970). 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas. "On the 
Changes as Causes of Acute 
Security. 16:2 (Fall 1991). 
Threshold: 
Conflict." 
"Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup 
World Security· Challenges for a New 
Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, 
Martin's Press, 1994. 294. 
Environmental 
International 
Conflict." In 
Century, eds. 
New York: St. 
Isaac, J. and Shuval H., eds. Water and Peace in the Middle 
East· Proceedings of the First Israeli-Palestinian 
International Academic Conference on Water, Zurich, 
10-13 December 1992, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.-
Studies in Environmental Science- 1994. 
Jervis, Robert. The T.ogi c of Images 
Relations. New York: Columbia 
Morningside Edition, 1989. 
in International 
University Press, 
----- Perception and Mispercepion in International 
Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. 
Kapstein, Ethan B. "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of 
International Politics." International Organization. 
49 (Autumn 1995) . 
Karaosmanoglu, Ali L. 
and Change." In 
Regj on of the 
Stuart, London: 
"Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity 
Politi cs and Security in the Southern 
Atlantic Alliance. ed. Douglas T. 
The Macmillan Press, 1988. 
----- "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and 
External Contexts." In NATO and Its Southern Alli es· 
Domestic and External Challenges. ed. John Chipman, 
New York: Routledge, 1988. 
"Savunma Politikam1z1 :tncelemek." In 
Savunmas1. Ankara: Tisa Matbaac1l1k Sanayi, 
Tiirk i ye' n in 
1987. 
----- "Turkey's Defense Policy: Problems and Prospects." In 
E1iropean Security Policy After the Revolutions of 
.1..9..8..9.. ed. Jeffrey Simon, Washington: The National 
Defense University Press, 1991. 
Kibaroglu, Ay$egul. "Prospects for Cooperation in the 
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin." Working Paper no 42 of 
Amsterdam International Studies, February 1996. 
Kliot, Nurit. W;:it-er Resources and Conflict 1n the Middle 
Ea.at.. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Kolars, John and Mitchell, W. A. The Euphrates River and the 
Southeast Anatolia Development Project. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1991. 
Kolars, "The Hydro Imperative of 
Energy." The Middle East ,Journal 
Turkey's Search for 
40:1 (Winter 1986). 
Kurkc;uoglu, Omer. Tlirkiye'nin Arap Ortadogusu'na Kar:;n 
Politikas1 (1945-1970). Ankara: Sevin<; Matbaasi, 1972. 
LeMarquand, David. "Politics of International River Basin 
Cooperation and Management." In Water in a Developing 
World, eds. Albert E. Utton and Ludwik Teclaff, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1977. 
Lewis, David K. Convention· A Philosophical Study. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969. 
Lynn-Jones, 
After· 
Press, 
Sean, and Miller, Steven eds. The Cold W;:ir 
Prospects for Peace. Cambridge, Mass.: 
1993. 
and 
MIT 
Mal 1 at , C . and Al 1 an, T . eds . W.....,..a ..... t...,e_r~~i ~n~~t~h~e~~M~i~d~d~l~e-~E~a ..... s~r~· 
Legal. Political ;rnrl Cnmmercial Implications. London: 
Tauris Academic Studies, 1995. 
Manisali, Erol, ed. Turkey· An Active Partner in Western-
Papers. Middle Eastern Economic Relations- Seminar 
Istanbul: ?, 1985. 
Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. "The Environmental and 
International Security." In World Security· 
~C~h_a~l~l ~e~n...,,g""'e~s_f~o .... r_...,a.._N....._,,_e'"""w.___..C .... e_..n ...... t ........... u.... r-r-y, eds . Michael T . Klare 
and Daniel C. Thomas, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1994. 
----- "Redefining Security." Foreign Affairs, 68:2 (Spring, 
1989) . 
Naff, Thomas, and Matson, Ruth C. eds. 
East· Conflict or Cooperation. 
Replica Edition, 1984. 
W;:iter in the Middle 
Boulder: Westview 
Neumann, Robert G. "Assad and the Future of the Middle 
East." Foreign Affairs. 62 (Winter 1983/1984). 
Nichols on , Michael . ...._F'_..o,_.r_.m.J.Jla ....... l _ __.T.._.h""'e .......... o'"""r_.i ..... e_.s..._ _ _.i .... n....___ .... r .... n ._.t....,e ......... r ..... n .,.a...,t__._i ...,o"'"n....,a........_1 
Rel at i ans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989. 
Norton, Augustus Richard and Wright, Robin. "The Post-Peace 
Crisis in the Middle East." Survival. 36 (Winter 1994-
1995). 
Okman, Cengiz. "Su Sorunu ve Ortadogu'da Stratejik Durum." 
In Su Sonmu. Tjirki ye ve Ortadogu, ed. Sabahattin Sen, 
Istanbul: Baglam Yay1nc1l1k, 1993. 
Ordeshook, P. Game Theory as Political Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Pakradouni, Karim. "Hafez al-Assad-The Arabs' 
Manchester Guardian Week] y. 12 9 (December 
In Hermann, "Syria's Al-Assad." 
Bismarck, " 
11, 1983). 
Pearce, David and Turner, Kerry. Economics nf Natural 
Johns Resources and the Environment. Baltimore: 
Hopkins University Press, 1990. 
Perthes, Volker. The Political Economy of Syria under Assad. 
London: I.B. Tauris, 1995. 
Pipes, Daniel. Greater Syria· 'T'he Hi story of an Ambition. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Postel, Sandra. Last Oasis· Facing Water Scarcity. New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1992. 
Rathmell, Andrew. "Syria's Insecurity." Jane's Intelligence 
Review. 6 (September, 1994). 
Riker, William H. "The Entry of Game Theory into Political 
Science." In 'T'owarn a Hi story of Game Theory. ed. E. 
Roy Weintraub, Durham: Duke University Press, 1992. 
Rogers, Peter. "The Value of Cooperation in Resolving 
International River Basin Disputes. " ~N~a~t~1~ir.....,,,.,a_.l___.R....,e_s""'-'-'o'""'u ...... r...... c.._,e..._s.._ 
Forum . 1 7 : 2 ( 19 9 3 ) . 
Rosenau, James. "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent 
Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," 
In New Direct i ans in the Study of Foreign Pol icy, 
eds. Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, and James 
N. Rosenau, Boston: Allan and Unwin, 1987. 
Russett, Bruce and Starr, Harvey. World Politics· 'The 
Menu for Choice. New York: W.W. Freeman and Company, 
1989. 
Saaty, Thomas L. Mathematical Monels of Arms Control and 
Disarmament· Application of Mathematical Structures 
in Politics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968. 
Sander, Oral. "Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity 
and Change. " In Modern Turkey· Conti m1 i ty and 
Change. ed. Ahmet Evin, Opladen: Leske Verlag and 
Budrich GmbH, 1984. 
Schmidt, Christian and Allan, Pierre. "Introduction" of G.am.e. 
Theory and International Relations· Preferences. 
Information and Empirical Evidence. eds. Pierre Allan 
and Christian Schmidt, Hants: Edward Elgar, 1994. 
Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu. Turkey's Security Policies. Adelphi 
Papers 164 (1981). 
----- "Prospects for a Southern European Security: A 
Turkish Perspective." In Southern European Security in 
the 1990s. ed. Roberto Aliboni, London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1992. 
----- "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons 
and Proliferation." Comparative Strategy. 14 (1995). 
Snyder, Glenn H. and Diesing, Paul. Conflict among Nations: 
Bargaining. Decision Making. and System Struct!lre in 
International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1977. 
Sprout, Margaret and Harold. Toward a Politics of the Planet 
Earth. New York: Van Nostand Reinhold Company, 1971. 
Starr, Joyce and Stoll, Daniel. US Foreign Pol icy on Wat er 
Besollrces in the Minrlle East. Washington, DC: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1987. 
eds. The Pol it i cs of 
E.a.s..t. Boulder: Westview, 
Scarcity· 
1988. 
Water in the Middle 
Stein , Arthur A . W......._h",!y'-_.N.....,a ....... t_.i_,,o,...n .... s..._.......,c .... o.,,o.LJp,.._e......._r_._a.._.t....,e~· _ _..C ..... i.._..r'-'c..._..u.,..m ..... s.._,t'""a...._....n ..... c .se=----_.a .... nU>..l.c1 
Choice in International Relations. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990. 
Steinberg, Gerald M. "Middle East Arms Control and Regional 
Security." Survival. 36 (Spring, 1994). 
Tibawi, A. L. A Modern History of Syria. London: Macmillan, 
1969. 
Ts ebe 1 is , George . ....,N .... e ...... s.._,t..._e,__,.d..____,G""";:i......_rn..,,.e ...... s~· -~R~a~t~i .... o~n~a~l..____~C~h.,.,o""'--'-j .... c... e~ _ _.__1 ...... n 
Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990. 
Ullman, Richard H. "Redefining Security." International 
Secl!rity. 8:1 (Summer 1983). 
Vali, Ferenc A. Bridge Across the 
Policy of Turkey. Baltimore: 
Press, 1971. 
Bosphorus · The Foreign 
Johns Hopkins University 
Waterbury, John. "Dynamics of Basin-Wide Cooperation in the 
Utilization of the Euphrates." paper prepared for the 
Conference: The Economic Development of Syria; 
Problems, Progress, and Prospects held at Damascus, 
January 6-7, 1990. 
Wirth, David. "Climate Chaos." Foreign Policy. 74 (Spring 
1989). 
Wyllie, James. "Turkey- Renationalizing Foreign Policy." 
Jane's Intelligence Review. 7:2 (1994). 
Yapp, M. E. The Near East Since the First World War, Vol. II 
London: Longman, 1991. 
Zeine, Z. N. The Struggle for Arab Independence. Beirut: 
Khayats, 1960. In Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "Revisionist 
Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of 
Syria." In The Foreign Policy of Arab States· The 
Cha l l enge of Change. eds. Bahgat Korany and A. E. 
Hillal Dessouki, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 
BIJteoi Univenlt, 
Librar_v 
